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. Introduction
From the metaphor of the closet' to that of the three dollar bill, tropes2 of
fraud, deception, and mimicry seem to trip off the tongue when the subject of a
queer sexual orientation arises. 3 Over the last decade, and particularly within
the last three years, marriage traditionalists have increasingly relied on a
particular rhetoric of deception-counterfeiting-to convey what in their view
is a species of public fraud: same-sex marriage and its close approximations,
civil unions and domestic partnerships. Indeed, counterfeiting rhetoric has
become so common in the legal controversy over same-sex marriage that its
sheer pervasiveness nearly renders it invisible.
In May 2003, Marilyn Musgrave, United States Representative and cosponsor of the original Federal Marriage Amendment (FMA), publicly declared
that a federal marriage amendment was necessary because "[t]he traditional4
values Americans hold are being traded in for counterfeit marital unions.,
1. See EVE KoSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 3-4 (1990) (describing
the closet as a metaphor applicable to sexual minorities); Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The
Literary Argument for HeightenedScrutiny for Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1753, 1793-1816
(1996) (discussing the closet as a symbol that suggests the political powerlessness of sexual
minorities).
2. A trope denotes the "turning" of a word away from its original meaning toward a new
meaning that is not immediately obvious. In Part IV this Article discusses the trope of"queer as
counterfeit."
3. The category of "queer" is by no means self-defining. This Article will demonstrate
that queer at once connotes passing and deception (e.g., queer/counterfeit currency) and a
resolute refusal to pass and to deceive (e.g., queer as ostentation). In this sense, queer
connotations partake of the same double bind in which the law routinely places sexual
minorities-simultaneously passing too much and not enough. See Kenji Yoshino, Covering,
111 YALE L.J. 769, 839-40 (2002) (defining queers as sexual minorities who do not pass and
who do not want to pass); ANNAMARJE JAGOSE, QUEER THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 1 (1996)
(noting that for some queer theorists, the "semantic clout" and "political efficacy" of the very
category of queer follow from its "resistance to definition").
4. Cheryl Wetzstein, Bill to Define MarriageTriedAgain in House as Two States Mull
Cases, WASH. TIMES, May 26, 2003, at A8.
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Representative Musgrave was not the first person involved in the same-sex
marriage debate to coin the analogy between same-sex marriage and
counterfeiting. Rather, its vintage in that debate may be traced at least as far
back as the mid-90s. In 1995, Robert Knight, Director of the Concerned
Women of America's Culture and Family Institute, deployed the counterfeiting
trope to describe same-sex marriage; 5 one year later, Gary Bauer, former
President of the Family Research Council, testified that same-sex marriage is "a
counterfeit that will do great harm to the special status that the genuine
institution [of marriage] has earned." 6 Nor is Representative Musgrave the last
to link subversive numismatic practices with non-normative sexual and
affective relationships. More recently, counterfeiting has become a routine way
to describe same-sex marriage and its imitative approximations, civil unions
and domestic partnerships, as well as the so-called artificial reproduction that
occurs in the context of a same-sex relationship. 7
Where does this counterfeiting language come from and what does it
signify? More importantly, what work is it doing in the legal controversy over
the extension of marital rights to same-sex couples? On one level, to compare
same-sex marriage to a counterfeit makes sense in light of the fact that sexual
minorities and counterfeit articles share a common language. The federal
criminal statute that targets counterfeiting, 18 U.S.C. § 472, imposes penalties
on those who either "pass," or attempt to "pass," counterfeit currency in the
United States.8 With respect to sexual minorities, Professor Kenji Yoshino has
amply documented just how pervasive the language and ideology of passing is
for gays and lesbians. 9 This Article will return to this idea that same-sex
couples are like counterfeit currency because artificial reproductive technology
is increasingly allowing them to pass for straight-part of the reason, this
Article submits, why procreation has suddenly become the dominant rationale
in same-sex marriage litigation today.

5. See David W. Dunlap, Some States Trying to Stop Gay MarriagesBefore They Start,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1995, at Al 8 (quoting Robert Knight saying, "It [same sex unions] might
be called a partnership, but if it's called marriage, it's a counterfeit version. And counterfeit
versions drive out the real thing").
6. Defense of MarriageAct of 1996: Hearing on S.1740 Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary,104th Congress (1996), available at 1996 WL 387291 (testimony of Gary L. Bauer
in favor of the federal Defense of Marriage Act).
7. See infra Part III (discussing generally the application of counterfeiting rhetoric to
same-sex marriages and civil unions).

8. 18 U.S.C. § 472 (2000).
9. See Yoshino, supranote 3, at 814-36 (documenting the cultural and legal contexts in
which passing norms occur).
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At the same time, to compare same-sex marriage to a counterfeit makes
about as much sense as does the claim that same-sex marriage will lead us
ineluctably down the slippery slope to incest. In a prior article, this author
argued that the slippery slope trope, "from same-sex marriage to incest," does
not hold up because incest is definitionally imprecise-just where is it that we
are slipping to when we slip into incest? '°--and because in many ways we have
already slipped." 1 Here, the author turns instead to the counterfeiting trope that
legal actors, among others, have recently deployed to describe the public fraud
that, in their view, same-sex marriage represents. The counterfeiting analogy to
same-sex marriage warrants close attention for two reasons. First, and more
narrowly, the counterfeiting analogy does not hold up because, quite simply,
same-sex marriage is not fooling the public and same-sex couples are not, at
least technically, passing for straight when they marry each other. Rather, that
12
relationship is, for many, more akin to the obscene: "I know it when I see it.,,
According to the recent same-sex marriage cases, same-sex couples are not only
different from cross-sex couples when it comes to the so-called essential
attribute of marriage-procreation-they are better than cross-sex couples
because they can procreate responsibly every time they wish to do so. Second,
and more broadly, the counterfeiting analogy, which highlights the negative
aspects of passing, runs counter to the passing demands that the law has placed
on sexual minorities for decades-from the military,' 3 to the family,' 4 to the
employment context.15 Whereas sexual minorities are routinely faulted for not
passing enough, counterfeiting rhetoric places them in the hopeless position of
passing too much. The procreation rationale, this Article will show, does
exactly the same-it effectively punishes same-sex couples for not only
passing, but for passing too well.
10. See Courtney Megan Cahill, Same-Sex Marriage,Slippery Slope Rhetoric, and the
Politics ofDisgust: A CriticalPerspectiveon ContemporaryFamilyDiscourseand the Incest
Taboo, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 1543, 1562 (2005) (noting that the definition of incest varies greatly
from state to state such that it is unclear where the slippery slope to incest ends).
11. See id. at 1566 (discussing constitutional challenges to incest prohibitions and
concluding that the recent same-sex marriage and sodomy cases have not taken society any
farther down the slippery slope than it already is).
concurring).
12. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
13. See, e.g., Yoshino, supranote 3, at 775 (discussing the debate over outing and the
military's "don't ask, don't tell" policy).
14. See id. at 858-64 (discussing custody and visitation restrictions on gay parents,
including court decisions allowing visitation rights if parents do not expose their gay, lesbian,
and/or bisexual relationships to their children or if they hide their sexual orientation).
15. See id.at 889-900 (discussing the passing demands that grooming restrictions place
on minorities in the employment context).
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This Article argues that the counterfeiting analogy to same-sex relations,
while on its face illogical, is intimately tied to concerns about sodomy and
same-sex procreation-each of which, this Article maintains, is viewed as a
fraudulent imitation that not only threatens the currency of marriage but also
represents a kind of economic fraud. It will show that the counterfeiting
analogy that has emerged in the legal discourse surrounding rights for gays and
lesbians not only makes a great deal of sense on its own, but also helps to make
sense ofthe current legal treatment of same-sex couples in the marriage context.
As with the current casting of same-sex relationships as counterfeit, the
counterfeiting analogy was once deployed to signify non-procreative sex
(sodomy) and transgressive procreation (miscegenation). Indeed, to accuse
someone of being a counterfeiter during the early-modem period was no small
business: Counterfeiters were not only implicitly linked to the sodomites, but
were, in fact, far worse than the sodomites. A look at that history is useful, and
necessary, for two reasons. First, it provides a lens through which to view, and
better understand, the bizarre claim that same-sex marriage is a counterfeit, a
statement which on its own fails to explain how a relationship that is regularly
characterized as a form of flaunting has suddenly become a deception
perpetrated on the public. Second, it helps to explain what is behind the highly
influential, and hugely successful, procreation rationale for same-sex marriage
prohibitions. 16
Until recently, it had appeared that the procreation rationale-the
argument that same-sex couples cannot legally marry because they cannot
sexually procreate with each other-was in desuetude, no longer "advanced
seriously by states or taken seriously by courts. 1 7 Even just a brief glance at
the state and federal reporters, however, reveals that the procreation rationale is
very much alive. 18 The recent resurgence of the procreation rationale has
stumped commentators and (some) judges alike, both of whom have dismissed
it as absurd and reminiscent of the same animus that the Supreme Court in

16.

See, e.g., Dale Carpenter, Bad Arguments Against Gay Marriage,7 FLA. COAST. L.

REV. 181, 193 (2005) ("The procreation argument enjoys great currency in academic and legal
discussions of gay marriage. Indeed, it is probably the most common argument against gay
marriage in these circles."); William C. Duncan, The State Interests in Marriage,2 AVE MARIA
L. REV. 153, 154 (2004) ("The most common state interest discussed in same-sex marriage case
law relates to procreation.").
17. Peter Cicchino, Reason and the Rule of Law: Should Bare Assertions of "Public
Morality" Qualify as Legitimate GovernmentalInterestsfor the Purposesof Equal Protection

Review?, 87 GEO. L.J. 139, 151 (1998).
18. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006) (upholding the state's
same-sex marriage prohibition partly on the basis of procreation); Andersen v. King County,
138 P.3d 963, 982 (Wash. 2006) (same).
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Romer v. Evans' 9 held was an impermissible basis for laws under even rational
basis review. They have queried: What does the procreation rationale mean for
cross-sex couples who cannot, or do not want to, sexually reproduce? 20 How
does it affect adopted children and their adoptive families? 2' Given its
emphasis on biological anatomy, doesn't it "hew[] perilously close" to gender
discrimination? 22 This Article argues that these criticisms, while useful, have
overlooked the extent to which the procreation rationale reflects a concern over
the fraudulent aspects of same-sex relations and same-sex procreation. It
proposes that the success of that rationale in recent same-sex marriage litigation
is better understood in light of the counterfeiting rhetoric that has also emerged,
alongside the procreation rationale, from the recent same-sex marriage debate.
While neither the counterfeiting analogy nor the procreation rationale makes
much, if any, sense when viewed in isolation, they both begin to make
considerably more sense when considered together.
This Article will proceed as follows. The first two Parts analyze the
procreation rationale and counterfeiting rhetoric, respectively, in order to set the
stage for Part IV and Part V's more substantive analysis of the relationship
between them. Part II summarizes the evolution of the procreation rationale
that states have offered in support of same-sex marriage prohibitions. In
addition, it maintains that pre-existing criticism of that rationale by jurists and
commentators fails to consider the extent to which the procreation justification
reflects a belief that same-sex marriage, and same-sex procreation, are a species
of fraud. Part III then provides an overview of the counterfeiting trope that has
been deployed by marriage traditionalists to describe civil unions and same-sex
marriage, and exposes the logical inconsistencies of that trope as applied to
both.

19. See Romer v. Evans, 571 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996) (finding that Amendment 2 to the
Colorado Constitution was based on animus toward gays and lesbians and therefore violated the
equal protection clause of the federal Constitution).
20. See infra Part II.B (noting that supporters of the procreation rationale for prohibiting
same-sex marriage use rhetoric similar to that found in cases involving fraudulent inducement to

marry).
21. See, e.g., Richard F. Storrow, Rescuing Childrenfrom the MarriageMovement: The
CaseAgainst MaritalStatus DiscriminationandAssisted Reproduction, 39 U.C. DAvis L. REv.
305, 307-09 (2006) (arguing that the involvement of the procreation rationale in the same-sex
marriage debate has led to favoritism toward marriage in the adoption context and such
favoritism is not related to the purposes of marriage or to child welfare).
22. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,965 (Mass. 2003); see also Kenji
Yoshino, Too GoodforMarriage,N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2006, at A2 (comparing the procreation
rationale for prohibiting same-sex marriage to the supposedly benign reasons for employment
discrimination against women in the past).
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Parts IV and V contend that while neither the counterfeiting trope nor the
procreation rationale makes much sense when considered separately, they both
begin to make a great deal of sense when considered in concert. Here, this
Article argues that counterfeiting is a single analogy that reflects the two
procreative concerns that are currently shoring up same-sex marriage
prohibitions: to wit, a fear of fraudulent (non-procreative) sex and fraudulent
families that pass for the real thing. In order to better understand the
counterfeiting analogy, as well as how sodomy and the families of same-sex
partners could possibly be thought of as fraudulent, Part V explores in greater
detail the historical linking of subversive sexual/reproductive relationships
(sodomy, miscegenation) and counterfeiting in legal and non-legal sources.
Part V is both narrow and broad in scope. First, and more narrowly, it
uses the history surveyed in Part III to explain the role that procreation is
playing in the legal controversy over same-sex marriage and to demonstrate the
extent to which that rationale reflects a concern about fraud. Second, and more
broadly, this Part uses that history to tell a much larger story about sexual fraud.
It will show that in some very real sense recent same-sex marriage litigation is
repeating the history of sodomy and miscegenation regulation-it's just that the
swindler has replaced the sodomite and the miscegenous relationship as the
explicit focal point of concern, and disgust for private acts is being rhetorically
channeled as outrage over public fraud. It will also suggest that this rhetorical
transformation attempts to render discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation legally defensible after Lawrence v. Texas.23
Part VI, which is more normative in scope, maintains that we might view
the counterfeiting analogy as at once restrictive and liberating. On the one
hand, the analogy continues to place sexual minorities in the proverbial double
bind that has characterized the law's treatment of that class since even before
Bowers v. Hardwick,2 4 where the Supreme Court, as Janet Halley observes,
rhetorically duplicates the double bind in a way that ultimately places gays and
lesbians in a double bind.2 5 Whereas the law routinely requires sexual
23. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571-74 (2003) (noting that morality no longer
constitutes even a rational basis for the legal regulation of certain conduct and certain
relationships).
24. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 186 (1986) (stating that there is no
fundamental right to same-sex sodomy under the Fourteenth Amendment).
25. See Janet E. Halley, ReasoningAbout Sodomy: Act and Identity In andAfter Bowers
v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REv. 1721, 1748 (1993) (pointing out that the Bowers' Court placed
sexual minorities in a double bind). The Bowers Court claimed that criminalization of same-sex
sexual conduct was based on a legitimate condemnation of gay and lesbian identity, and yet at
the same time, found the statute nondiscriminatory because it only prohibited conduct and
therefore did not target a certain identity. Id.

400

64 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 393 (2007)

minorities to pass, both the counterfeiting analogy and the procreation rationale
curiously fault them for passing too much. On the other hand, the
counterfeiting analogy provides an opportunity to reassess the central role that
the state plays in creating and maintaining the value of cross-sex marriage as an
original form, and to explore the productive possibilities of imitative
performance more generally. As several notable queer and other postmodern
theorists have shown, imitation of an allegedly original form, be it gender or
marriage, has the power to throw the ontological primacy of that form into
question. 26
This Article begins by asking a few relatively simple questions. First, why
have same-sex couples been accused of committing a fraud when the
relationship in question is open, obvious, and so often characterized as a form
of flaunting? Second, why have courts upheld same-sex marriage prohibitions
on the basis of a rationale as wispy and weightless as procreation?
Understanding the history and theory behind the rhetorical linking of sexual
relationships and subversive economic practices helps to clarify not only how
same-sex marriage is like counterfeiting, but also what is doing some of the
work to shore up the procreation rationale for same-sex marriage prohibitions.
Simply because the counterfeiting analogy might make sense in theory,
however, does not mean that it is immune from criticism. Counterfeiting
rhetoric is not only descriptively inaccurate, but also perpetuates the double
bind which sexual minorities know all too well. While same-sex marriage
proponents might put the analogy to positive use by exploring the productive
possibilities of imitation, they should at the same time remain wary of a
comparison that perpetuates the same double bind that supports discriminatory
treatment under the law.
11. Same-Sex Marriage and the ProcreationRationale: A History
and Critique
In 1998, Peter Cicchino remarked that "[t]he argument from procreation,
that same-sex relationships will bring about the decline of the nation through
underpopulation, no longer seems to be either advanced seriously by states or
taken seriously by courts. ' ,27 However, a survey of state and federal cases that
26. See infra Part VI.B (comparing the relationship among the procreation rationale, fears
of racial miscegenation in the past, and the fear common to opponents of miscegenation and
same-sex marriage that these imitative forms of white heterosexual marriage cast doubt on the
superiority of that original form).
27. Cicchino, supra note 17, at 151.
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have recently addressed the constitutionality of same-sex marriage prohibitions
reveals that the procreation rationale for those prohibitions is in the
ascendant-and, indeed, doing most of the work to insulate them from
successful constitutional attack. The ongoing success of the procreation
rationale requires a close examination of what is driving that rationale as well
as of the fundamental assumptions on which it rests. Section A summarizes the
trajectory of the procreation rationale for same-sex marriage prohibitions
through its most recent appearance in a series of cases involving state and
federal constitutional challenges to those prohibitions. Section B then discusses
the major criticisms of that rationale offered by legal commentators and by
some courts in order to highlight a point that they have missed and that Parts I
and IV will more fully develop, namely, that the procreation justification is
inextricably tied to concerns about fraud.
A. The Evolution of the ProcreationRationale: From Sterile NonProcreatorsto SuperiorProcreators
1. ProcreationRationale: "Preservation-Through-Transformation"
The evolution of the procreation rationale for same-sex marriage
prohibitions over the last thirty-five years vividly illustrates what Professor
Reva Siegel has referred to as a process of "preservation-throughtransformation," 28 that is, the process by which legal actors abandon the
"justificatory rhetoric" of an older, contested "status regime 2 9 in favor of
"new ... reasons to protect" that regime.30 According to Siegel, the
justificatory rhetoric that traditionally supported status hierarchies based on sex
and race has evolved in such a way so as to assume a kinder, gentler face-a
rhetorical transformation that has, in turn, allowed for the continuation or
preservation of those same status hierarchies. 3' In her seminal piece, Siegel
focuses on the evolution of the law's treatment of (marital) domestic violence

28. Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of
Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1111, 1113 (1997).
29. Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogativeand Privacy, 105
YALE L.J. 2117, 2179 (1996).
30. Id. at 2119 (1996).
31. See id. (noting that civil rights agitation will pressure elites to simultaneously cede
some privileges of a status regime and change the rhetoric to preserve much of the same
regime).
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and on the extent to which that evolution has worked to preserve a gender
hierarchy within marriage.32
This Section turns instead to the evolution of the procreation rationale
for same-sex marriage prohibitions and on the extent to which that evolution
has worked to preserve a pre-existing hierarchy based on sexual orientation
with respect to who might enter into a marital relationship. The argument
that cross-sex procreation is necessary to propagate the species has ceded to
more innocuous-sounding procreation rhetoric that ironically casts sexual
minorities in a more positive light than their cross-sex counterparts.
Nevertheless, and partly because current justificatory rhetoric sounds more
complimentary to gays and lesbians than did prior procreationist rhetoric, the
pre-existing status hierarchy that excludes same-sex couples from marriage
has remained largely in place.
2. ProcreationRationale: Evolution
During the early same-sex marriage litigation in the 1970s, courts
routinely adverted to the traditional version of the procreation rationale in
sustaining those prohibitions against a range of state and federal
constitutional challenges. In most of those cases, the procreation rationale
appeared alongside the strict definitional approach to marriage, that is, the
circular argument that marriage is by definition a civil contract between a
man and a woman. 33 In the process, sexual procreation-that is, both the
ability and the capacity to procreate sexually-became the principle feature
that distinguished same-sex relations from the cross-sex paradigm of
reproduction.
In the first case to uphold the constitutionality of a same-sex marriage
prohibition, Baker v. Nelson,34 the Supreme Court of Minnesota cited biblical
authority and federal Supreme Court precedent, respectively, when it
observed that "[t]he institution of marriage as a union of man and woman,
uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of children within family, is as

32. See id. at 2118-19 (charting the changes in the law's treatment of domestic violence).
33. See Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 n.2 (C.D. Cal. 1980) ("The
dictionary definition of the term 'spouse' is a husband or wife."), affd,673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir.
1982); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971) ("Black's Law
Dictionary furnishes three definitions of marriage, all of which recognize that it is a union or
contract between a man and a woman.").
34. See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971) (holding that the state's marriage
statute prohibited same-sex marriage and did not violate the federal Constitution).
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old as the book of Genesis," 35 and, quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 36 that
"[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival
of the race. 3 7 The Baker court's linking of marriage and a certain kind of
procreation-presumably that of the sexual variety-through Skinner quickly
became authority for courts first considering the constitutionality of same-sex
marriage prohibitions in the 1970s. Thus, in Singer v. Hara,38 the Washington
Court of Appeals reasoned that the state's refusal to grant a marriage license to
two males was "not based upon [their] status as males" (and therefore in
violation of that state's equal rights amendment) but rather "upon the state's
recognition that our society as a whole views marriage as the appropriate and
desirable forum for procreation and the rearing of children. 3 9 The court at
once made clear that by "appropriate and desirable forum for procreation" its
focus was not so much on the kind of family that a child would be born into but
rather on the kind of parents who were having (or who could have) a child in
the first place-namely, those who were biologically equipped to reproduce
sexually with each other. 40 As the court remarked: "The fact remains that
marriage exists as a protected legal institution primarily because of societal
values associated with the propagation of the human race .... [I]t is apparent
that no same-sex
couple offers the possibility of the birth of children by their
41
union."

Courts hearing constitutional challenges to same-sex marriage prohibitions
in the 1980s and 1990s continued to support the definitional approach to
marriage by relying on the procreation rationale and by using sexual
procreation to distinguish same- and cross-sex relationships. For instance, in
Adams v. Howerton, a federal district court in California looked favorably upon
that state's same-sex marriage prohibition in part because "the main
35,

Id. at 186.

36. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (finding that the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution protects procreation).
37. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186 (quoting Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541).
38. See Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Wash. App. 1974) (finding that the denial
of a marriage license to same-sex couples is allowed by the laws and constitution of the State
and of the United States).
39. Id. at 1195.
40. Id.
41. Id.; see also Hatcher v. Hatcher, 580 S.W.2d 475, 483 (Ark. 1979) (citing the
dictionary definition of marriage as "a contract between a man (husband) and a woman (wife)"
and supporting that definition by observing that "[m]arriage is an important institution that is
fundamental to our very existence and survival") (citations omitted); Jones v. Hallahan, 501
S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973) (citing various dictionary definitions of marriage as a union
between a man and a woman).
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justification in this age for societal recognition and protection of the institution
of marriage is procreation, perpetuation of the race., 42 In upholding the lower

court's ruling-which dealt not with a same-sex marriage prohibition per se but
rather with whether a same-sex partner constituted a "spouse" under the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952-the Ninth Circuit observed that

because "homosexual marriages never produce offspring,, 43 same-sex marriage
prohibitions were permissible under both the federal and the state
constitutions. 44 For this reason,45 two men could not be considered "spouses" for

federal immigration purposes.
Similarly, in Dean v. Districtof Columbia,46 the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia relied heavily on sexual procreation when it upheld the
District's same-sex marriage prohibition against both a due process and an
equal protection challenge. As with Baker and its progeny, Dean cited Skinner
for the proposition that "[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very
existence and survival of the race., 47 Moreover, the Dean court remarked that
"in recognizing a fundamental right to marry, the [Supreme] Court has only
contemplated marriages between persons of opposite sexes-persons who had
the possibility of having children with each other,, 48 as well as that "the aspect
of marriage that elevates it to a 'fundamental' right under the due process
49
clause [is] the capacity to have children together.,
On one level, the Dean court's procreative reasoning placed it directly on
the line of cases, starting with Baker, which drew a link between marriage and
42. Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 1980); see also Soos v.
Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1356, 1360 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) ("Marriage and procreation are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.") (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942)); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 73 n.8 (Haw. 1993) (Heen, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the purpose of the marriage regulation at issue was to promote procreation);
DeSanto v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952, 954 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (noting that various sources
define marriage as being between a man and a woman).
43. Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 1982).
44. Id. (upholding the statute denying preferential status to spouses of same-sex
marriage).
45. See id. (finding that Congress "rationally intended to deny preferential status to the
spouses of [homosexual] marriages"); see also Constant A. v. Paul C.A, 496 A.2d 1, 18 n.6 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1985) ("If the traditional family relationship (lifestyle) was banned, human society
would disappear in little more than one generation .... A primary function of government and
law is to preserve and perpetuate society .... ").
46. See Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995) (rejecting constitutional
challenges to the District of Columbia's same-sex marriage ban).
47. Id. at 333 (citations omitted).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 335.
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sexual procreation and which suggested that the right to marry rested upon the
biological possibility to procreate sexually. Under this view, sexual procreation
constituted the primary axis around which the right to marry revolved and
according to which it was defined, and was the central feature that
distinguished same- and cross-sex relationships. On another level, however,
Dean's justificatory rhetoric in other parts of the opinion foreshadows the
different sort of procreative reasoning that has appeared in the more recent
same-sex marriage cases. More specifically, although Dean suggests that the
possibility of sexual procreation is a necessary (albeit not sufficient) attribute of
marriage, it also suggests, in another part of the opinion, that the "principal
purpose [of marriage is]: To regulate and legitimize the procreation of
children. 50 Here, the focus is not so much on sexual procreation and on the
propagation of the species that it ostensibly guarantees, but rather on the fact
that marriage provides a forum for responsible procreation-as the primary or
principal objective of marriage shifts from procreation per se to the
legitimization of children who are procreated outside a marital context.
This modified version of the procreation justification that appears
alongside the old version in Dean has become the predominant procreationist
rationale in recent same-sex marriage litigation. To be sure, and contrary to
Cicchino's assertion that procreation as "propagation of the species" is "no
longer taken seriously by courts, 5 1 residues of the former procreationist
rhetoric continue to appear in some of the more recent same-sex marriage
cases. 52 Increasingly, however, courts are contemplating a more fully
developed version of the so-called "private welfare rationale 5 3 to which the
Dean court gave nod, a rationale that reflects an anxiety over the extent to
which same-sex relations/reproduction is similar to, rather than different from,
cross-sex relations/reproduction. More specifically, most courts have found
that procreation constitutes a rational basis for marriage statutes that exclude
same-sex partners from their definitional ambit because "[m]arriage's vital
purpose is not to mandate procreation but to control or ameliorate its

50. Id. at 337 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 385-86 (1978); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
51. Cicchino,supra note 17, at 151.
52. See, e.g., Smelt v. City of Orange, 374 F. Supp. 2d 861, 880 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (stating
that "procreation is necessary to perpetuate humankind, encouraging the optimal union for
procreation is a legitimate government interest"), aff'd inpart,rev 'd in part,447 F.3d 673 (9th
Cir. 2006).
53. Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 276 (N.J. 2005) (Parrillo, J., concurring) (explaining
the term "private welfare rationale"), aff'd as modified by 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006).
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consequences-the so-called 'private welfare' purpose.
To maintain otherwise
'5 4
is to ignore procreation's centrality to marriage.
In a nutshell, the private welfare procreation rationale proceeds as follows:
The state's predominant objective in regulating marriage is to provide a forum
in which responsible child-bearing and child-rearing may occur and to ensure
that children are legitimized. It is not, as the former same-sex marriage cases
suggested, to mandate that procreation occur within marriage in the first place.
Furthermore, cross-sex reproduction can be, and often is, accidental. Same-sex
reproduction, however, can only ever be the product of choice, planning, and
forethought. While the state's interest in promoting responsible cross-sex
reproduction is significant, its interest in promoting responsible same-sex
reproduction is de minimis in light of the fact that same-sex couples are already
responsible procreators by virtue of the very manner in which they reproduce.
Because same-sex marriage bears no relation to the state's interest in creating a
forum in which either responsible cross-sex reproduction or the legitimization
of non-marital children may occur, statutes that limit marriage to cross-sex
individuals are constitutional under the lowest level of judicial scrutiny.
Interestingly, although this newer version of the procreation rationale for samesex marriage prohibitions continues to highlight the differences between natural
cross-sex reproduction and artificial same-sex reproduction, it implicitly (and
sometimes explicitly) acknowledges a similarity between these two modes of
reproduction, namely, the fact that same-sex couples can reproduce and are
reproducing.5 5
A more detailed explanation of this so-called private welfare rationale
appears in Morrison v. Sadler,56 where the Indiana Court of Appeals upheld
that state's same-sex marriage prohibition exclusively on the ground that it
advanced the state's legitimate interest in encouraging responsible procreation
between cross-sex couples.57 Its explanation, which is representative of the
current version of the procreation rationale and which has been cited favorably
by several courts, is worth quoting in full:
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. See Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d. 307, 336 (D.C. 1995) ("[H]omosexual
couples, absent state law or policy impediments, can and do elect parenthood, through adoption,
surrogacy, or artificial insemination-the result being that parenthood, and even the benefits of
procreation, are not necessarily limited to formally united heterosexual couples."); Baker v.
State, 744 A.2d 864, 881 (Vt. 1999) ("[A] significant number of children today are being
conceived by [same-sex] parents through a variety of assisted-reproductive techniques.").
56. See Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15 (Ind. App. 2005) (upholding the limitation of
marriage to cross-sex couples).
57. Id. at 28-29 (finding that the disparate treatment of same- and cross-sex couples was
reasonably related to the State's responsible procreation justification).
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Becoming a parent by using "artificial" reproduction methods is
frequently costly and time-consuming. Adopting children is much the
same. Those persons wanting to have children by assisted reproduction or
adoption are, by necessity, heavily invested, financially and emotionally, in
those processes. Those processes also require a great deal of foresight and
planning. "Natural" procreation, on the other hand, may occur only
between opposite-sex couples and with no foresight or planning. All that is
required is one instance of sexual intercourse with a man for a woman to
become pregnant.
What does the difference between "natural" reproduction on the one
hand and assisted reproduction and adoption on the other mean for
constitutional purposes? It means that it impacts the State of Indiana's
clear interest in seeing that children are raised in stable environments.
Those persons who have invested the significant time, effort, and expense
associated with assisted reproduction or adoption may be seen as very
likely to be able to provide such an environment, with or without the
"protections" of marriage, because of the high level of financial and
emotional commitment exerted in conceiving or adopting a child or
children in the first place.
By contrast, procreation by "natural" reproduction may occur without
any thought for the future. The State, first of all, may legitimately create
the institution of opposite-sex marriage, and all the benefits accruing to it,
in order to encourage male-female couples to procreate within the
legitimacy and stability of a state-sanctioned relationship and to discourage
unplanned, out-of-wedlock births resulting from "casual" intercourse.
Second, even where an opposite-sex couple enters into a marriage with no
intention of having children, "accidents" do happen, or persons often
change their minds about wanting to have children. The institution of
marriage not only encourages opposite-sex couples to form a relatively
stable environment for the "natural" procreation of children in the first
place, but it also encourages them to stay together
and raise a child or
8
children together if there is a "change in plans.0
In other words, procreation is a rational basis for same-sex marriage
prohibitions because "recognition of same-sex marriage would not promote the
State's interest in marital procreation, particularly unintended procreation from
heterosexual intercourse." 59 In Part IV, I will return to the Morrison court's
framing of same-sex reproduction as a better, more efficient product than its
cross-sex counterpart, and I will suggest that this image of same-sex procreation

58. Id. at 24-25 (citations omitted).
59. Hernandez v. Robles, 794 N.Y.S.2d 579, 599 (Sup. Ct. 2005), rev'd and vacated by
805 N.Y.S.2d 354 (2005), aft'd, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006)
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ironically conflicts with the image of same-sex procreation as counterfeit that
has emerged from the same-sex marriage debate.
As with Morrison, the more recent same-sex marriage cases reflect a
similar shift in the courts' procreative reasoning, as the encouraging
procreation for the perpetuation of humankind argument has evolved into the
managing procreation as the consequence of heterosexual sex argument.6 °
Curiously, courts no longer cast same-sex couples seeking marital rights in
terms of what they lack-the ability to procreate sexually and thereby to help
perpetuate the human race. Rather, the current deployment of the procreation
rationale casts same-sex couples who wish to reproduce in terms of what they
alone possess-the ability to procreate responsibly every time they wish to do
so. Moreover, because same-sex reproduction is allegedly better than its
cross-sex counterpart, same-sex couples and their families neither need nor
require the state's protection in the form of marriage. While courts continue
to emphasize the difference between same- and cross-sex relationships,
artificial reproduction has replaced the mere ability to reproduce sexually
(and to propagate the species) as the key diacritical feature that distinguishes
those relationships and that renders differential treatment of them
constitutionally relevant.

60. See, e.g., Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1308 (M.D. Fla. 2005) ("DOMA
'encourage[s] the creation of stable relationships that facilitate the rearing of children by both of
their biological parents."' (quoting, in part, the federal government's Memorandum in Support
of Motion to Dismiss at 15-16)); Hernandez,805 N.Y.S.2d at 371 ("[R]ecognition of same-sex
marriage would not promote the State's interest in marital procreation, particularly unintended
procreation from heterosexual intercourse, nor would it promote the State's interest in dualgender parenting.") (emphasis added); Shields v. Madigan, 783 N.Y.S.2d 270, 276 (Sup. Ct.
2004) (applying the rational basis test the court noted that "preserving the institution of marriage
for opposite sex couples serves the valid public purpose of preserving the historic institution of
marriage as a union of man and woman, which, in turn, uniquely fosters procreation")
(emphasis added); Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 463 (Ariz. App. Div. 2003)
("Because same-sex couples cannot themselves procreate, the State could reasonably decide that
sanctioning same-sex marriages would do little to advance the State's interest in ensuring
responsible procreation within committed, long-term relationships."). The dissent in Goodridge
v. Departmentof Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) noted that:
If society proceeds similarly to recognize marriages between same-sex couples who
cannot procreate, it ... might result in the mistaken view that civil marriage has
little to do with procreation: just as the potential of procreation would not be
necessary for a marriage to be valid, marriage would not be necessary for optimal
procreation and child rearing to occur. In essence, the Legislature could conclude
that the consequence of such a policy shift would be a diminution in society's
ability to steer the acts of procreation and child rearing into their most optimal
setting.
Id. at 1002 (Cordy, J., dissenting).

THE GENUINE ARTICLE

At the same time, the fact that courts like Morrison are acknowledging
that same-sex couples can reproduce and are reproducing suggests an implicit
recognition of, and discomfort with, the very thing-procreation-that is
starting to bridge the gap between same- and cross-sex couples. Although
same-sex couples cannot reproduce through sexual means with each other, the
fact remains that artificial reproductive technology, which was less common
during the early phase of same-sex marriage litigation when the procreation as
propagation rationale was at its height, offers them the opportunity to procreate
and to generate a product that looks very much like the original model of crosssex reproduction. As one court recently noted:
To be precise, same-sex couples can cause procreation. A female capable
of producing children can be married to another female and become
pregnant through various methods, then produce and raise the child in her
same-sex union. Similarly, a same-sex male couple could cause a female to
become pregnant, directly or otherwise, and later adopt and raise the
child.6 '

This explicit recognition of the ability of same-sex couples to cause procreation
signals not only a notable shift from earlier procreationist rhetoric that deployed
procreation in order to distinguish same- and cross-sex relationships, but also a
growing awareness of the extent to which those relationships are starting to
look more, not less, like each other.

61. Coordination Proceeding, Special Title [Rule 1550(c)] (Marriage Cases), No. 4365,
2005 WL 583129, at *12 n.3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 2005); see also Hernandez, 794
N.Y.S.2d at 599 ("[T]he reality is that significant numbers of couples in New York have formed
same-sex families, and numerous couples will continue to do so, whether they are allowed to
marry or not."). The dissent in Lewis v. Harris,875 A.2d 259 (N.J. 2005), aff'das modified by
908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006) noted that:
[T]he claim that the promotion of procreation is a vital element of marriage and
justifies exclusion of persons of the same gender falls on its face when confronted
with reproductive science and technology. The fact is some persons in committed
same-sex relationships can and do legally and functionally procreate.
Id. at 255 (Collester, J., dissenting).
For further discussion of this issue, see Castle v. State, No. 04-2-00614-4 (Wash. Super.
Ct. Sept. 7, 2004) ("Same-sex couples can and do legally procreate through assisted
reproduction and adoption."), rev'd, Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006);
Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 962 n.24 (Mass. 2003) ("If procreation
were a necessary component of civil marriage, our statutes would draw a tighter circle around
the permissible bounds of nonmarital child bearing and the creation of families by noncoital
means."); Baker v.Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 881 (Vt. 1999) ("[T]here is no dispute that a
significant number of children today are actually being raised by same-sex parents, and that
increasing numbers of children are being conceived by such parents through a variety of
assisted-reproductive techniques.").
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B. ProcreationRationale: Criticisms

This Section addresses some criticisms of the procreation rationale, both in
its past formulation as "marriage encourages the propagation of the species,"
and in its current formulation as "marriage encourages responsible cross-sex
procreation and the legitimization of children." These criticisms neglect to
explain why that rationale, notwithstanding its obvious flaws, is doing most of
the work to sustain same-sex marriage prohibitions today. More importantly,
they fail to recognize how the recent analogy between counterfeiting and samesex relations provides a clue as to what is behind the courts' procreative logic.
Several commentators, and a few courts, have observed that the
procreation rationale is unconvincing and vulnerable to attack. Their criticisms
focus on the rationale's tenuous legal grounding, questionable factual
grounding, or both, as well as on its inaccurate portrayal of the contemporary
family. First, and with respect to the procreation as propagation argument,
some critics have relied on cases like Skinner and Turnerv. Safley6 2 to rebut the
contention that the fundamental right to marry is conditioned on the ability to
procreate.63 Other critics have turned to the law governing the grounds for

marital annulments and divorces in order to refute the notion that procreation is
a necessary condition of marriage. 64 Relying, in part, on the fraudulent
inducement to marry line of cases, they have argued that fraud with respect to a
spouse's ability or willingness to procreate, rather than a spouse's innate
62. See generally Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (discussing the prison
correspondence regulation in relation to marriage as well as the prisoner regulation that required
a warden's permission for an inmate to marry).
63. See Jamal Greene, Comment, DivorcingMarriagefrom Procreation,114 YALE L.J.
1989, 1994 (2005) ("Because the Turner Court struck down a marriage ban that applied to a
population with no legal right to procreate and that provided an exception for pregnancy, the
decision undermines any claim that marriage is fundamental because of an inexorable
connection to procreation."). The Comment argues that the Skinner Court's use of the
conjunctive "and" in its celebrated declaration about the importance of procreation to the
"survival of the race" suggests "independence, not confluence, between marriage and
procreation." Id. at 1994. In addition, Skinner was not a fundamental right to marry case, but
involved the unequal application of a state law that both interfered with procreation as "one of
the basic civil rights of man" and violated the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. As such, the Court's "discussion of marriage was incidental to its discussion
of the importance of procreation." Id. Nowhere in Skinner does the Court even remotely
suggest that the basic civil right to marry is dependent on the basic civil right to procreate or that
the right to marry is only considered to be a fundamental for those who are able to procreate
sexually with each other.
64. See, e.g., Lawrence Drew Borten, Note, Sex, Procreation,and the State Interest in
Marriage,102 COLUM. L. REv. 1089, 1092 (2002) (stating that "the State's interest in the sexual
component of marriage has traditionally been implicated only by the potential for children to be
born outside of it, rather than by a need to encourage or guarantee procreation").
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capacity to procreate, is the driving force behind the law's treatment of marital
annulments/divorces on the basis of fraud.65 In Coordination Proceeding,
Special Title [Rule 1550(c)], Marriage Cases, the California Superior Court
also noted this distinction when it looked unfavorably upon that state's use of
the fraudulent inducement to marry line of cases in support of the procreation
rationale for its same-sex marriage prohibition. As the court remarked, "the
cases cited by the [State] do not establish that California courts have recognized
that the purpose of marriage in this state is procreation. Instead, these cases
establish that annulment is a remedy for the fraudulent inducement to marry. '66
Finally, other critics and courts have responded to the procreation as
propagation rationale by simply noting its flagrant over- and underinclusiveness, 67 its tenuous basis in logic, and its complete lack of empirical
support.6 8
Second, and with respect to the encouraging responsible procreation
argument, some courts have flatly remarked that "the prevention of same-sex
marriages is wholly unconnected to promoting the rearing of children by
married, opposite sex-parents." 69 Remarkably, even courts that have upheld
same-sex marriage prohibitions have observed that the encouraging responsible
procreation rationale is troubling because such reasoning would appear to
militate against marital rights for those individuals who either cannot reproduce
or do not want to. Concurring in Morrison, one judge voiced his misgivings
over the majority's conclusion that the same-sex marriage prohibition at issue
65. See id. at 1112 ("In contrast to consummation by sexual intercourse, which courts
uniformly describe as virtually synonymous with the marital relationship, procreation has only
inconsistently been treated as an implied term, and is often treated as something subject to
negotiation between the parties.").
66. Marriage Cases, supra note 61, at *8. The dissent in Lewis noted that:
[I]f procreation or the ability to procreate is central to marriage, logic dictates that
the inability to procreate would constitute grounds for its termination. However, as
opposed to the inability or unwillingness to engage in sexual intercourse, the
inability or refusal to procreate is not a legal basis for divorce or annulment.
Lewis v Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 285 (N.J. 2005) (Collester, J., dissenting).
67. See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 16, at 205 (stating that the procreation rationale would
appear to "expose a potential political flaw in the procreation argument: by repeatedly
emphasizing the importance of procreation in marriage, opponents of gay marriage run the risk
of demeaning the many married couples for whom procreation is either unwanted or physically
impossible").
68. See id. at 194 ("If Western civilization is truly facing a population implosion, as some
suggest, that is attributable to many factors other than gay marriage."); Deane v. Conaway, No.
24-C-04-005390, 2006 WL 148145, at *7 (Md. Cir. Ct. Jan. 20, 2006) ("This Court, like others,
can find no rational connection between the prevention of same-sex marriages and an increase
or decrease in the number of heterosexual marriages or of children born to those unions.").
69. Deane, 2006 WL 148145, at *7.
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in that case was constitutional because it rested on the rational basis of
"encourag[ing] responsible procreation, and same-sex couples cannot procreate
through sexual intercourse. 70 The judge admitted that he was "somewhat
troubled by this reasoning."' 1 He continued to explain that:
Pursuant to this rationale, the State presumably could also prohibit sterile
individuals or women past their child-bearing years from marrying. In fact,
I would assume the State may place any restrictions on the right to marry
that do not negatively impact the State's interest in encouraging fertile,
opposite-sex couples to marry.72
While useful, these criticisms neglect to consider precisely why
procreationist rhetoric has persisted despite its myriad flaws. If the Supreme
Court has suggested that the fundamental right to marry is not reserved to those
who are able (or who want) to procreate, and if the law governing marital
annulments is clear that procreation is not a necessary condition of marriage,
then why have courts given, and in some instances continue to give, such
weight to the procreation as propagation rationale? Moreover, if the
encouraging responsible procreation rationale lacks even a remote connection
to same-sex marriage prohibitions, why has it become the main procreationcentered rationale in same-sex marriage litigation today? Put more simply,
what is really doing the work to sustain either version of the procreation
justification?
This Article maintains that these procreation justifications, which on their
face make little sense, are better understood in light of both the counterfeiting
rhetoric that has recently emerged in the same-sex marriage debate and the
history behind that rhetoric. Specifically, and as the following Parts will show
in greater detail, understanding the history and theory behind the deployment of
counterfeiting language to describe non-normative sexual and reproductive
relationships gets us one step closer to discerning: (1) why same-sex marriage
provokes such anxiety among marriage traditionalists today; (2) why
procreation remains their overriding concern; and (3) the logic on which both
versions of the procreation rationale for same-sex marriage prohibitions rest.
At this point, I offer three brief reasons why we should be thinking about samesex marriage prohibitions in the larger context of fraud, of which counterfeiting
is a variety.

70. Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 36 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (Friedlander, J.,
concurring).
71. Id. at 37.
72. Id. at 36-37.
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First, it is not an accident that states like California in the MarriageCases
are citing to the fraudulent inducement to marry line of cases in support of the
procreation rationale for same-sex marriage prohibitions.73 While a few
commentators (and at least one court) have remarked that those cases do not
stand for the proposition that procreation is a necessary condition of marriage, 74
some of the fraudulent inducement cases and their not-so-distant relativesthose cases in which annulments and/or divorces are granted on the basis of
impotency--do stand for a very important point that the critical commentary
has overlooked: The idea that marriage without sexual procreation is in some
sense a sham and a fraud, not a "real" or "true" marriage at all.
For instance, in Santos v. Santos,75 a fraudulent inducement case, the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island granted a husband-spouse's petition for divorce
on the ground that his wife concealed an intention, allegedly formed prior to the
marriage, not to engage in "normal sexual intercourse 7 6 with him during the
marriage and a desire "to engage ...in unnatural intercourse" with him
instead.77 Although the court did not elaborate specifically on what it meant by
"unnatural sexual intercourse," it did suggest that the term was synonymous
with non-procreative sex of the sort engaged in between members of the same
sex-as the wife left her husband after only three days of marriage "to associate
with a girl friend of questionable reputation, for whose love she professed a
preference. 7 8 In keeping with the law governing fraudulent inducements to
marry, the court granted the husband's petition on the ground that the wife did
not enter into the marriage in good faith.79 More interesting, however, is the
court's suggestion that what was fraudulent about the wife's behavior was not
only the concealment of her true intention at the time the marriage was
contracted, but also the "unnatural intercourse" in which she allegedly sought to
engage with her husband. The court remarked, "the only reasonable inference
from the uncontradicted and unexplained evidence of her own conduct... is

73. See Marriage Cases, supra note 6 1, at *6-8 (discussing cases in which annulment was
granted where marriage had been fraudulently induced).
74. See id. at *8 (discussing the line of fraudulent inducement cases); see also Borten,
supra note 64 (discussing the State's interest in the sexual component of marriage).
75. See Santos v. Santos, 90 A.2d 771 (R.I. 1952) (holding that a wife's concealment of
her intent not to consummate the marriage is grounds for divorce).
76. Id. at 772.
77. See id. at 774 (stating that the wife's "design to engage only in abnormal conduct...
was repugnant to and destructive of the basic purpose and terms of the marriage covenant").
78. Id.
79. See id. (stating that the wife's lack of good faith destroyed any possibility of mutuality
and therefore prevented a valid marriage contract from coming into existence).
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that from the beginning she had not intended to enter into a true marriage."80 In
other words, the marriage was fraudulent not only because the wife withheld
information from her husband at the outset of the marriage, but also because
she wanted to engage in a certain kind of sex with him, non-procreative sexual
intercourse, that rendered their marriage less authentic or true.
Similarly, in D. v. C.,81 a New Jersey court granted a wife's petition for
annulment on the ground that she suffered from "vaginismus, 'an emotional or
mental disorder"' that rendered her impotent, even though "she was normal
organically and anatomically., 82 Because the wife was allegedly ignorant of her
condition prior to marriage, D. v. C. was not a fraudulent inducement case per
se. Rather, what was at issue there was whether the wife, as the impotent
spouse, could bring the annulment action or whether such actions were
available to potent spouses only. 83 D. v. C. is nevertheless interesting because it
raises the idea, of particular relevance here, that marriage without penetrative,
procreative sex is a sham or an inauthentic marriage-a fraud even in the
absence of actual fraudulent conduct. As the court stated in dicta after finding
that annulment actions could be brought by either the potent or the impotent
party: "The public interest in dissolving a mock marriage is the same
whichever of the parties is incapable." 84 The fact that the D. v. C. court uses
language resonant of fraud, "mock marriage," is particularly noteworthy
because the court was not dealing with a fraudulent inducement case at all.
Indeed, the fact that the wife was acting in good faith with respect to her
alleged condition did not render her non-procreative marriage any more true
and any less a counterfeit.
The language used by the Santos court to describe non-procreative sexual
acts and the D. v. C. court to describe the incapacity to have procreative sex
suggests that a marriage that exists without procreative intercourse is a sham or
mock marriage-it is a fraud in and of itself. It could be, then, that lawmakers
are relying on the fraudulent inducement to marry line of cases (and on the
annulment of marriage/divorce cases more generally) in support of same-sex
marriage prohibitions currently because they are at the very least thinking about
same-sex relationships as fraudulent in the sense that they are non-procreative
and therefore a travesty of the true or authentic thing.
80. Santos, 90 A.2d at 774. (emphasis added).
81. D. v. C., 221 A.2d 763,764 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1966) (finding that an impotent
spouse is entitled to annul a marriage).
82. Id.
83. See id. (stating that the question of whether the wife, as an impotent spouse, could
bring an annulment action was a matter of first impression in that court).
84. Id. at 765 (emphasis added).
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Second, it makes sense to think about same-sex marriage in terms of fraud
because certain legal academics have both implicitly and explicitly
conceptualized the state's recognition of that relationship as a kind of fraud. In
Sex andReason, Judge Richard Posner contended that "permitting homosexual
marriage would place government in a dishonest position of propagating a false
picture of the reality of homosexuals' lives." 85 More recently, and indeed more
explicitly, Professor Lynn Wardle has remarked that "if same-sex unions do not
contribute to the essential social purposes of marriage, a state that confers the
a
legal status of marriage upon same-sex unions commits fraud when it presents
86
false image of same-sex unions as comparable to traditional marriage.
Third, the policy rhetoric surrounding the same-sex marriage debate makes
explicit this connection between same-sex marriage and fraud that emerges in
the cases and the academic commentary alike. Both before, and even more so
after, the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas, those who oppose
marriage equality for same-sex couples have increasingly turned to a rhetoric of
fraud in order to justify legislative and constitutional measures banning samesex marriage. It is to this rhetoric and its implications that this Article now
turns.
11. The Same-Sex MarriageDebate andthe CounterfeitingAnalogy: A
Survey and Critique
Comparisons between same-sex relations and counterfeiting have become
so common and so frequent in the rhetoric surrounding the same-sex marriage
(and same-sex civil unions) debate that they all but escape our attention. This
Part looks at those comparisons in order to place into the foreground a
rhetorical trope whose sheer pervasiveness often causes us to forget that it is
there in the first place-and, more importantly, to overlook the extent to which
that trope does not hold up. Section A will provide an exhaustive survey of the
recent analogies that same-sex marriage opponents have made between samesex relations and counterfeiting. Section B will then demonstrate the ways in
which the counterfeiting trope is descriptively inaccurate as applied to both
civil unions and same-sex marriage, thus forcing one to ask just why that trope
has persisted notwithstanding its imprecision.

85.

RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON 312 (1992).

86. Lynn Wardle, "Multiply and Replenish": ConsideringSame-Sex Marriagein Light of
State Interests in MaritalProcreation,24 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 771,775 (2001) (emphasis
added).
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A. CounterfeitingRhetoric in Law and Policy Today
Opponents of rights and benefits for same-sex couples in the form of civil
unions8 7 and domestic partnership recognition 88 routinely conceptualize such
marriage approximations or marriage equivalents in the language of counterfeit.
For instance, just one month after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001,
Robert Knight accused "homosexual activists"-that is, the gay and lesbian
partners of victims of the 9/11 attacks who sought benefits from the September
11 Victim Compensation Fund and the American Red Cross--of "trying to
hijack the moral capital of marriage and apply it to their own relationships,"
which he characterized as "counterfeit marriage. 8 9 In just a single stroke,
Knight managed to conflate genuine terrorism, LGBT activism, same-sex
relationships, and counterfeiting in a way that situated those four varieties of
assault on the same symbolic plane and that no doubt resonated with a public
intensely fearful of each. 90
87. Civil unions are state-sanctioned relationships between two same-sex individuals.
Connecticut, New Jersey and Vermont are the only jurisdictions in the United States that
recognize civil unions between same-sex partners. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b-38bb
(West 2005) (stating that only parties of the same sex are eligible for civil unions); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 37:1-1 (WEST 2007) (repealing New Jersey's prohibition of same-sex marriage); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1202 (2005) (stating that parties to a valid civil union must "be ofthe same
sex and therefore excluded from marriage laws").
88. A domestic partnership is a legal relationship recognized by the state and/or
jurisdiction in which it is entered; unlike civil unions, domestic partnership recognition does not
guarantee the same rights and benefits that the state confers upon cross-sex married couples.
California, Hawaii, Maine, and the District of Columbia are the onlyjurisdictions in the United
States that recognize domestic partnerships (but not civil unions) between two same-sex
individuals. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (Deering 2007) (defining and providing the
requirements for establishing a domestic partnership); HAw. REv. STAT. § 572C-1 (2006)
(including domestic partners as reciprocal beneficiaries); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 18, § 1-201
(2006) (giving inheritance rights to domestic partners); D.C. CODE § 32-701(3) (2006) (defining
domestic partner).
89. Press Release, People for the American Way, Religious Right Groups Oppose Relief
Assistance for Surviving Same-Sex Partners Following Terrorist Attacks, http:///www.pfaw.org/
pfaw/general/default.aspx?oid=4135 (last visited Feb. 5, 2007) (remarks of Robert Knight) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Matt Foreman, Anti-Gay Groups
Active in Massachusetts: A Closer Look, at 12, available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/
downloads/reports/reports/AntiGayGroupsMA.pdf.
90. Knight's casting of gays and lesbians as the "terrorists" in our midst whose aim it is to
devise new and better ways to bring down the institution of marriage, set the stage for later
comparisons between terrorism and the gay rights movement. For instance, Lou Sheldon,
founder and Chairman of the Traditional Values Coalition, evoked similar imagery when he
responded to the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas by drawing on the 9/11 trope:
"This is a major wake-up call ....This is a 9/11, major wake-up call that the enemy is at our
doorsteps. This decision will open a floodgate ....This will redirect the stream of what is
morally right and what is morally wrong into a deviant kind of behavior." Robert B. Bluey,
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Like Knight, Janet LaRue, Chief Counsel for Concerned Women for
America (CWA), has deployed similar, albeit less incendiary, counterfeiting
rhetoric to describe the legal regime that would have existed under the version
of the Federal Marriage Amendment (FMA) that was first introduced in
Congress in 2002. The original version of the FMA, which failed to pass in the
Senate in 2003, defined marriage as a "union between a man and a woman,"
and stated, in part, that "[n]either this Constitution or the constitution of any
state, nor state or federal law, shall be construed to require that marital status or
the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or groups." 91
The 2006 version of the FMA, which failed to pass in the Senate in June 2006,
altered some of the language of the 2002 version to read, in part, that "[n]either
this Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be construed to require
that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other
than the union of a man and a woman. 9 2 Whereas the 2006 version, unlike its
predecessor, targets the unions of same-sex couples exclusively, both versions
leave open the possibility that state legislatures will confer the legal incidents of
marriage upon unmarried same-sex couples, even if they are not required to do
so under either the federal Constitution or their respective state constitutions.
While the drafters and proponents of the FMA contended that "[t]he traditional
autonomy of state legislatures on family law matters is preserved by the text of
the Amendment, 9 3 LaRue decried the counterfeit scheme that its permissive
language failed to capture:
America has federal laws to protect our currency because we recognize that
counterfeit currency is a serious threat to our national economy. We must
have laws to preserve and protect marriage because counterfeit marriage is
Homosexuals Pushfor Same-Sex MarriageAfter Sodomy Ruling, CHRISTIAN NEWS SERVICE,
June 27, 2003, http://www.cnsnews.com/Culture/Archive/200306/CUL20030627a.html (last
visited Feb. 5, 2007) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
91. The full version of the original FMA read: "Marriage in the United States shall
consist only of the union of a man and a woman. Neither this Constitution or the constitution of
any state, nor state or federal law, shall be construed to require that marital status or the legal
incidents thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or groups." H.R.J. Res. 93, 107th Cong.
(2002). The original FMA was drafted by the Alliance for Marriage (AFM).
92. S.J. Res. 1, 109th Cong. (2006). The 2006 version of the FMA-which was itself
based on an earlier version that failed to pass in Congress in 2004-therefore allows courts to
confer the legal incidents of marriage upon unmarried cross-sex couples, something which the
2002 version did not permit. See generally H.R.J. Res. 106, 108th Cong. (2004); S.J. Res. 40,
108th Cong. (2004).
93. Janet LaRue, Why Concerned Women for America Opposes the FederalMarriage
Amendment, Aug. 18, 2003, http://www.cwfa.org/articledisplay.asp?id=4452&departmentLEGAL&categoryid=family (last visited Feb. 5, 2007) (statements of Matt Daniels, Founder and
President, Alliance for Marriage) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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a serious threat to the stability of society and the health and welfare of
children. CWA opposes the Federal Marriage Amendment (FMA) [of
2002] because it would not prevent state legislatures from recognizing and
benefiting civil unions and other such relationships, which would result in
legalized counterfeit marriage. 94

LaRue further remarked that "[t]he FMA does not prevent legislative acts that
would create civil unions that are counterfeit marriages. Although legally
distinct from marriage, it is a distinction without a difference in all other
respects." 95 For this reason, "CWA believes that an amendment to preserve
marriage should do more than preserve it in name only. 96
Knight and LaRue's comparison of civil unions to counterfeit currency
has become a routine way of characterizing any legal regime that recognizes
either, or both, civil unions and the extension of marriage-like rights to samesex couples. Thus, when the St. Thomas More Law Center sued the Ann
Arbor, Michigan public school district in 2003 for using taxpayers' dollars to
extend insurance benefits to same-sex partners, Richard Thompson, the
Center's chief counsel, stated that "[t]he purpose of this lawsuit is to stop
these counterfeit marriages."9 7 Similarly, Utah's Amendment 3 both defines
marriage exclusively in cross-sex terms and provides that "[n]o other
domestic union, however denominated, may be recognized as a marriage or
given the same or substantially equivalent legal effect."98 Its supporters
stated that the amendment would, among other things, "[p]revent the courts
or other government officials from subverting that definition [of traditional
marriage] by authorizing counterfeit marriage." 99 Supporters of similar
amendments and laws in other states, like Arkansas, Pennsylvania and Ohio,
have remarked that an expansive marriage protection amendment is necessary
in order both to prevent "counterfeit marriage that devalue[s] traditional
marriage in the same way counterfeit money devalues real money"'0 0 and to
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Id.
Id.

97. Brian Burch, Law Center Sues to Stop Taxpayer Funding of Same-Sex Benefits in
Michigan,Sept. 22, 2003, http://www.thomasmore.org/news.html?newsid=l 15 (last visited Feb.
5, 2007) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
98. Utah MarriageAmendment Deserves Support, Sept. 7, 2004, http://www.marriage
debate.com/2004/09/utah-marriage-amendment-deserves.htm. (last visited Feb. 5,2007) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
99. Id.
100. Arkansas Marriage Amendment Committee: A Campaign to Protect Marriage in
Arkansas, JudicialandLegal Questions, http://www.arkansasmarriage.comn/static/about/faq.php
(last visited Feb. 5, 2007) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also
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a unique place in our society and protect[ ] it
"identiq~y] marriage as having
1
from any counterfeits." 01
Some opponents of civil unions and similar de facto marriage equivalents
push the counterfeiting metaphor even further to suggest a parallel relationship
between the injurious effects of counterfeit currency on the actual capital of the
economy and the injurious effects of de facto marriage on the symbolic capital
of marriage. As one representative in Virginia's House of Delegates opined:
Counterfeit money hurts our wallets. Counterfeit marriage will do the same
to real marriage. Homosexuals need no special institution parallel to
marriage, such as civil unions, to enjoy the same rights under law to vote,
buy a house, go to public colleges, start businesses,
02 and exercise rights and
opportunities now available to all Virginians.1
Or, as Tony Perkins, President of the Family Research Council, recently
remarked: "We do not support the civil union and domestic partnership laws
because we see them as counterfeit institutions. Just as counterfeit $20 bills
impact our economy, we feel these counterfeit unions have an impact on our
culture."'103 For these and other marriage traditionalists who flatly oppose the
extension of legal and economic benefits to same-sex couples, "[c]ivil unions
are nothing but a counterfeit form of marriage. Just as counterfeiting currency
has the potential to bankrupt an economy, redefining the social foundation of
civilization by transforming homosexual behavior into a public norm has the
potential to wreak havoc on social life as Americans know it."' 04 It is worth
American Family Association of Pennsylvania, March 15-MarriageProtection Amendment
(MPA) Voted Out of Committee-But What Happened the Next Day? (Mar. 27, 2006),
http://www.afaofpa.org/action alertarchives_2006.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2007) ("[S]amesex marriage [and] its counterfeit--civil unions.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
101. State v. Knipp, No. 2004 CRB 039103, 2005 WL 1017620, at *4 (Ohio Mun. Ct.
Mar. 10, 2005) (quoting the Ohio Campaign to Protect Marriage website, www.ohio
marriage.com/legal_issues & news.shtml).
102. Rep. Robert G. Marshall, Letter to the Editor, No 'New Jim Crow' in Virginia, WASH.
POST. July 3, 2004, at A25, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
articles/A24784-2004Jul2.html (supporting Virginia's Marriage Affirmation Act); see also Ruth
Padawer, Seeking Society's Embrace: Gay Couples Sue New Jerseyfor Right to Marry, THE
REcoRD (Hackensack, NJ), July 21, 2002, availableathttp://www.lambdalegal.org/news/in-thenews/seeking-societys-embrace.html (quoting the head of the New Jersey Family Policy
Council, Len Deo's, remarks that "[a]ny attempt to counterfeit marriage as anything different
than one man and one woman degrades the real thing") (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
103. Timothy Dailey, The Slippery Slope ofSame-Sex Marriage,Family Research Council,
Sept. 2005, http:// www.frc.org/get.cfin?i=BC04CO2 (last visited Feb. 5,2007) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
104. PBS Online Newshour, The Battle Over Same-Sex Marriage,http://www.pbs.org/
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noting that similar counterfeiting analogies also surfaced in the debate
surrounding the extension of marriage-like benefits to same-sex couples in
England during the passage of the Relationships (Civil Registration) Bill,
which became law in that country on November 18, 2004. Simon Calvert,
Deputy Director of The Christian Institute in England, remarked that the effect
of the Bill would be to "devalu[e] the10currency
of marriage in the law. It's
5
Monopoly money-not the real thing.
Just as civil unions, domestic partnerships, and benefits for same-sex
couples more generally have been compared to a counterfeit form of marriage,
so, too, has same-sex marriage itself been compared to a counterfeit form of the
cross-sex archetype. Robert Knight relied on the counterfeiting trope as early
as 1995, when he stated that "[s]ame-sex couples do not qualify [for marriage].
It might be called a partnership, but if it's called marriage, it's a counterfeit
version. And counterfeit versions drive out the real thing."' 1 6 More recently,
and as mentioned in this Article's Introduction, Marilyn Musgrave deployed the
analogy in support of the Federal Marriage Amendment in 2003.107 Since that
time, a significant number of same-sex marriage opponents have made such
remarks as same-sex marriage is "a counterfeit, which cheapens the real
thing" 0 8 and "[s]ame sex marriage devalues traditional marriage the same way
counterfeit money devalues real currency."' 0 9 In their view, "it is a falsehood to
call it a marriage. Those who are claiming social or legal recognition of their
relationship as if it were a true marriage are thus asking society and the law to
affirm a falsehood."" 10 Indeed, testifying before the Maryland House Judiciary
Committee in January 2006 in support of that state's proposed marriage
amendment, Knight remarked that "creating counterfeits [like same-sex
newshour/bb/law/gaymarriage/q2.html (remarks of Peter Sprigg, Director of the Family
Research Council's Marriage and Family Studies) (last visited Feb. 5, 2007) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
105. Press Release, The Christian Institute, Gay Partnerships Bill Creates Counterfeit
Marriage (Oct. 24, 2001), http://www.christian.org.uk/pressreleases/2001/october242001.htm
(last visited Feb. 5, 2007) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law review).
106. Dunlap, supra note 5, at A18.
107. Wetzstein, supra note 4, at A8.
108. Sandy Rios, How Does Gay MarriageHurt the TraditionalThing? Let s Count the
Ways, HISPANIC MAGAZINE.COM, Mar. 2004, http://www.hispaniconline.com/magazine/2004/
march/Forum/index.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2007) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
109.

Jan Dean, Gay MarriageAttacks Family Unit: Protestor,MISSISSAUGA NEWS, Mar. 4,

2005.
110.

Kenneth D. Whitehead, Why Same-Sex "Marriage"Is a Bad Idea, CATHOLIC WORLD

NEWS, June 1, 2006, http://www.cwnews.com/news/viewstory.cfm?recnum=32617 (last visited
Feb. 5, 2007) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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marriage] undermines support in the law and culture for the real thing."' 11 Or,
as made clear in a public statement issued by the St. Thomas More Law Center
immediately after the successful passage of a constitutional marriage
amendment in Michigan on Election Day, 2004: "The amendment is intended
to prohibit courts or other efforts to impose same-sex marriage, polygamy, or
any other form of counterfeit 'marriage' on the state."'1 2 Similar counterfeiting
rhetoric also surfaced in the controversy over same-sex marriage in Spain,
which legalized that relationship in 2005. Following the Spanish cabinet's
approval of a proposal allowing same-sex couples both to marry and to adopt
children, which was signed into law on July 2, 2005, Juan Antonio Martinez
Camp, a spokesperson for the Spanish Bishops' Conference, stated on national
television that "permitting same-sex marriage would be like imposing a virus on
society" and that "the decision would be tantamount to introducing a counterfeit
currency" in Spain. 113
Opponents of same-sex marriage have deployed counterfeiting rhetoric to
convey not only their concern that same-sex marriage cheapens and devalues its
cross-sex counterpart, but also their belief that same-sex partnerships are
intrinsically non-procreative. As Janet LaRue remarked:
Granting same-sex couples a license to marry will not create true marriage.
Neither two men nor two women can become one flesh. Licensing the
unnatural does not make it natural. It would be a state-sanctioned
counterfeit, a sham and a fraud. A licensed electrician cannot produce
power by taping two same-sex plugs together. Homosexual sex is
dangerous and14destructive to the human body and powerless for human
reproduction.'
This idea that two (or too) similar entities-two same-sex electrical plugs, two
men, two women--cannot mix in a positively reproductive way, resonates with
a similar analogy that was recently made by Glen Lavy, Senior Counsel of the
Alliance Defense Fund (ADF) and Senior Vice President of ADF's Marriage
Litigation Center, in reference to a lawsuit brought in Israel challenging that
111. The Maryland Marriage Amendment: Hearing on Maryland H.B. 48 Before the
House Judiciary Comm., 2006 Session (statement of Robert Knight).
112. Thomas More Law Ctr., Michigan Voters Join Nationwide Mandate in Support of
TraditionalMarriage-Law Center Preparedto Defend Bans ifChallenged,Nov. 3, 2004
http://www.thomasmore.org/news.html?NewslID=-247 (last visited Feb. 5, 2007) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
113. Marlise Simons, Spain's Secular Agenda Infuriates the Clergy, INT'L HERALD
TRIBUNE, Oct. 5, 2004, at *2, available at 2004 WL 5285873.
114. Janet LaRue, Talking Points: Why Homosexual "Marriage"Is Wrong, Sept. 16,
2003, http://www.cwfa.org/articledisplay.asp?id=4589&departrnent=LEGAL&categoryid=fam
ily (last visited Feb. 5, 2007) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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country's same-sex marriage restriction. Commenting on one of the reasons
why same-sex marriage warrants prohibition, Lavy said: "It takes sodium and
chloride to make salt. If you add sodium to sodium, you don't have salt. If you
add chloride to chloride, you don't have salt. . . . It takes a man and a woman
to make babies.""15
The remarks of other commentators similarly evoke a connection between
counterfeit and non-procreative sex. As one critic of same-sex marriage
commented:
A same-sex marriage is no marriage at all. It is a counterfeit, a fraud.
Governments have wisely encouraged true marriages because they stabilize
society and benefit governments in a dozen diffeient ways. Same-sex
marriages are counterfeit, immoral, totally sterile, lacking the No. 1 reason
for marriage-procreation-ignoring the wisdom of ages and common

sense.

16

The Catholic Civil Rights League of Ottowa, Canada, made this connection
between non-procreative sex and counterfeit even more explicit:
Excluding same-sex couples from marriage is not related to their
homosexual orientation, or to them as individuals. Rather, the exclusion of
their relationship is related to the fact that it is not inherently procreative,
and, therefore, if it is included within marriage, marriage cannot
institutionalize and symbolize respect for the transmission of life. To
recognize same-sex relationships as marriage would unavoidably change
and eliminate this function of marriage. Same-sex "marriage" devalues the7
real thing in the same way that any counterfeit devalue[s] the authentic."t
It bears noting that similar statements have found their way into the
Congressional Record. Testifying before Congress on behalf of DOMA in
1996, Gary Bauer, former President of the Family Research Council, remarked
that, were the state to recognize a marriage between same-sex partners:
[T]he fiction [of same-sex marriage would be] imposed on everyone and
the counterfeit [would] do great harm to the special status that the genuine
institution has earned.... [M]arriage is a unique bonding of the two sexes,

115.

Michael Foust, Israel, Too? Supreme Court in Holy Land to Hear 'Gay Marriage'

Case in Late May, BP NEWS, Apr. 6, 2006, http://www.bpnews.net/bpnews.asp?lD=22990 (last
visited Feb. 5, 2007) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
116. Morton James, Letter to the Editor, Same-Sex MarriageIs No Marriageat All, CHI.
DAILY HERALD, Apr. 25, 2004, at 17, availableat 2004 WLNR 5637560.
117.
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http://www.ccrl.ca/index.php?id=122 (last visited Feb. 5, 2007) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).

THE GENUINE ARTICLE
with the probable expectation of procreation of children .... [C]reating
a
8
counterfeit would be a slap in the face to millions of Americans.' 1
Indeed, each of these statements call to mind the D. v. C. court's remarks that
even a cross-sex marriage without procreative sex is a "mock marriage"-a
"sham" and a "fraud"-as well as the Santos court's suggestion that a marriage
without "normal sexual intercourse" is not a "true marriage" at all.' 19
B. Undoing the CounterfeitingAnalogy
The counterfeiting trope that same-sex marriage opponents have deployed
to illustrate the threat that both civil unions and same-sex marriage represent
defies logic for the following reason: Neither civil unions nor same-sex
marriage as their opponents conceptualize them resembles what we typically
think about when we think about counterfeits. For instance, LaRue notes that
the difference between marriage and civil unions represents a "distinction
without a difference" and that the original FMA as drafted preserved marriage
"in name only," thus suggesting that civil unions and marriage are substantively
the same as, or at least similar to, each other. 120 LaRue's conceptualization of
civil unions as counterfeit, however, is descriptively inaccurate because her
vision of counterfeit does not reflect what a true counterfeit is. We typically
think about a counterfeit as a product that is identical in form to, although
different in substance (or intrinsic worth) from, the original that it is attempting
to copy. 12' Indeed, the critical difference between a Louis Vuitton original and
a Louis Vuitton counterfeit is the fact that the latter differs in substance from
the former even though the two assume the same name or form-to wit, a Louis
Vuitton. LaRue, however, appears to be suggesting quite the opposite: While
civil unions are nominally or formally distinguishable from marriage (i.e., they
are in name something else), they are substantively similar to that institution
(i.e., they guarantee similar rights and benefits, thus differing in name only).

118. Defense of MarriageAct of 1996: Hearingon S. 1740 Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Congress (1996) (statement of Gary L. Bauer, President, Family Research
Council).
119. See supra notes 75-84 and accompanying text (discussing Santos and D. v. C.).
120. See LaRue, supra note 93 (arguing that civil unions are "legalized counterfeit
marriages").
121. For instance, under the Lanham (Trademark) Act a counterfeit is defined as "a
spurious designation that is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a designation
as to which the remedies of this chapter are made available by reason of section 220506 of Title
36." 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (2000).
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Under this formulation, civil unions are not a counterfeit at all because they
alert the public that they are not, in fact, a Louis Vuitton marriage original.
Similarly, Knight's deployment of the counterfeiting trope to describe both
same-sex marriage and civil unions does not hold up because neither of those
relationships is a true counterfeit. To recall, in 1995, Knight remarked that
while same-sex couples might form a partnership, they cannot form a genuine
marriage: "[I]f it's called marriage, it's a counterfeit version. And counterfeit
versions drive out the real thing."'122 More recently, and with respect to the
extension of non-marital rights to same-sex partners, Knight has suggested that
the FMA "allows for legislatures to enact the rest of the homosexual agenda
right up to civil unions and other forms of counterfeit marriage. As written, the
amendment will give politicians cover while they promote homosexuality 23
by
only."'1
name
in
defended
be
to
important
too
is
Marriage
other means....
A fundamental incongruity marks Knight's (and LaRue's) deployment of
counterfeiting rhetoric to describe civil unions and same-sex marriage. As with
LaRue, in Knight's estimation, the problem with civil unions is that they are
substantively similar to marriage but are called something else-the only
difference between them being a nominal one that acts as a cover for what
really lies beneath. Furthermore, the problem with same-sex marriage is that it
both shares all the attributes of marriage and is called the same thing: "If [a
same-sex partnership] is called something else [other than just a
partnership] ... it's a counterfeit version. 1 24 In other words, if the problem
with civil unions is that they are nominally distinct from marriage but possess
many of the substantive attributes thereof, the problem with same-sex marriage
is that it both possesses all of the substantive attributes of marriage and is called
the same thing. What Knight fails to recognize, however, is that, under this
formulation, neither civil unions nor same-sex marriage represents a true
counterfeit-a product that looks formally identical to, but is substantively
different from, the original that it is attempting to copy. In either instance, the
counterfeiting trope as it has been deployed fails accurately to depict what is
fraudulent about civil unions and marriage, respectively. Indeed, to accuse
same-sex couples of perpetrating a fraud is curious in light of the fact that their
relationships are so often characterized as a form of flaunting that is best
relegated to the closet. Unlike a counterfeit, and as mentioned in the
122. Dunlap, supra note 5, at A18.
123. Robert H. Knight, No Room For Compromise: Lending Legitimacy To Any Sex
Outside MarriageIs Not a Reasonable Position, NATIONAL REvIEW ONLINE, Aug. 9, 2001,
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-knight0809Ol.shtml (last visited Feb. 5,
2007) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
124. Dunlap, supranote 5, at A18.
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Introduction, same-sex
marriage is, for many, akin to the obscene: "I know it
25
when I see it.,'

Given its descriptive imprecision, one wonders why the counterfeiting
trope has had such resonance in the same-sex marriage debate. Put another
way, what exactly is driving counterfeiting rhetoric notwithstanding the fact
that, when analyzed closely, neither same-sex marriages nor civil unions are a
true or authentic counterfeit? This Article submits that the answer to both this
question and that posed in the previous Part-why the procreation rationale for
same-sex marriage prohibitions has persisted in the law despite its flaws-lies
somewhere at the intersection of counterfeiting and procreation. The claim
here, which this Article will more fully develop in the next two Parts, is the
following: Just as the counterfeiting trope makes more sense when viewed in
light of the unnatural and deceptive non-procreative acts that it signifies, the
procreation rationale for same-sex marriage prohibitions makes more sense
when viewed as a kind of counterfeit or fraud perpetrated upon the public.
While procreation alone might not constitute even a rational basis for same-sex
marriage prohibitions, the prevention offraud surely does. For this reason, it is
necessary to understand the relationship between counterfeiting and procreation
in order to see how each is shoring up the other in the same-sex marriage
debate.
IV Sodomy, Miscegenation, and the CounterfeitingAnalogy
Analogies between non-normative sexual practices and subversive forms
of commercial exchange have a history and a tradition both in and outside the
law. The purpose of this Part is to survey that history in order to provide a
structure for Part V, where this Article will discuss the work that the
procreation rationale is doing in the contemporary same-sex marriage debate.
Section A examines selected texts from the early-modem period that describe
sodomy and counterfeiting in analogous terms. Part V will use this history to
argue that the procreation rationale reflects a similar anxiety over sodomy as a
crude counterfeit of cross-sex reproduction that allows intra-relationally sterile
sexual minorities to accumulate wealth that the rest of the population lacks.
Section B examines the nineteenth-century deployment of counterfeiting
rhetoric to describe the counterfeit product of that era's signature nonnormative sexual relationship, miscegenation.
Part V will use the
miscegenation parallel to argue that the procreation rationale reflects a similar
125. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)(reasoningthat
although obscenity is not easily defined, it is easily recognized).
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anxiety over same-sex procreation as a counterfeit form of exchange that allows
the families of same-sex couples to pass for the real thing.
A. Sodomy and Counterfeiting
In November 2001, "homosexual activists" were accused of "waging a
war" against the Salvation Army when they launched the "Queer Dollars
Campaign" against that charitable organization in Cleveland, Ohio. 126 As a
form of public protest against the Salvation Army's discriminatory employment
policies toward sexual minorities in the areas of hiring and domestic-partner
benefits, LGBT activists from Anti-Racist Action of Cleveland deposited phony
three-dollar bills into the Salvation Army's kettles during its annual drive"queer" bills that contained the following slogan: "When the Salvation Army
ends its policy of religious bigotry against gay, lesbian, bisexual and
transgender people, then and only then will this be a real dollar bill.', 127 One
"Homosexuals
website reported the incident with the following headline:
128
Currency."'
Counterfeit
with
Army
Salvation
Attack
The symbolic protest undertaken by Cleveland's Anti-Racist Action was
no doubt inspired by the slang phrase "queer as a three dollar bill," the origins
of which may be traced back to the early-modem association between queer as
homosexual activity and queer as counterfeit money. According to the Oxford
Dictionaryof Modern Slang, two seemingly distinct, yet conceptually related,
exist for the word queer, specifically, "homosexual" and "counterfeit
definitions
money."129 The Dictionary explains that the latter use of queer-as-counterfeit
derives from at least the seventeenth century, when "counterfeiters" and
"receivers of false coins" were labeled "queer-cole-maker[s]" and "queer-colefencer[s]," respectively. 130 The Dictionary is silent, however, as to the
etymology of queer as homosexual, other than noting that this particular slang
version of queer exists. According to the more comprehensive Oxford English
Dictionary,however, the poet and writer, W. H. Auden, was the first person to
126. Martha Kleder, Homosexual Activists Target Salvation Army Kettles, CONCERNED
WOMEN FOR AMERICA, Nov. 28, 2001, http://www.cwfa.org/articles/322/CFI/cfreport/index.htm
(last visited Feb. 5, 2007) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
127. Id.
128. Marcellus Watts, Homosexuals Attack Salvation Army With Counterfeit Currency,
FREE REPUBLIC, Nov. 19,2001, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/fr/574336/posts (last visited
Feb. 5, 2007) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
129. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MODERN SLANG 182 (John Ayto & John Simpson eds.,
1992) (giving two definitions of queer).
130. Id.
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use queer to mean homosexual in 1932."3 While both Oxford dictionaries
therefore observe the two-fold use of the word queer to denote counterfeiting
and homosexuality, neither appears to recognize its dual usage as signifying
anything but a linguistic coincidence. That is, neither dictionary accounts for a
more comprehensive connection (or interrelationship) between the subversive
economic practice of counterfeiting and homosexuality--or, perhaps more
accurately, the "utterly confused category"' 132 of sodomy that the latter has come
to represent.
Scholars of language and early-modem literature, however, have
suggested otherwise. They maintain that the use of queer to describe both
subversive economics and subversive sexuality is not adventitious. Rather,
"[q]ueer as homosexual appears to grow out of... antecedent coining
terminology;" moreover, "[t]he modem usage might be traced to early
sexological formulations in which homosexuality was seen as an illegitimate, or
counterfeit, imitation of heterosexuality."'1 33 In his examination of the
"historical overlapping of these seemingly distinct queer discourses"' 34 during
the early-modern period, Fisher cogently demonstrates that "sodomy and
counterfeiting were... united conceptually long before the linguistic
connection was established."'' 35 In Fisher's view, a "particular cultural logic...
structures the connection between sodomy" 136 and the economic transgression
of counterfeiting-the same logic that gave rise to the dual use of queer in the
first place. As another scholar of the early-modem period has noted: "The
common denominator [between queer as homosexual and queer as counterfeit]
is difference, unnaturalness, fraudulence; but within that thwarting of the
straight, the signifier queer shuttles between spheres of the material-money
' 37
and geometry-to more inchoate spheres of ethics and identity."'
In order to understand the current formulation of same-sex relations as
counterfeit, then, it is necessary to understand the cultural origins of the earlymodem association between sodomy/homosexuality and counterfeiting. At first
blush, and using the analogy of queer-as-a-three-dollar-bill as our starting point,
it would appear that the association between queer as homosexual and queer as
counterfeit is descriptively inaccurate if it is intended merely to suggest that
sb. lang.).

131.

XII OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1015 (2d ed. 1989) (entry for queer,

132.

MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: VOLUME 1: AN INTRODUCTION 37

(Trans. Robert Hurley 1999).
133. Will Fisher, Queer Money, 66 ENGLISH LITERARY HISTORY 1, 14 n.5 (1999).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at2.
137. Casey Charles, Queer Writes, 28 WOMEN'S STUD. 32, 36 (2005).
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sexual minorities are deceptive in the same way that counterfeit bills are
deceptive. While this idea that sexual minorities-to whom the language of
passing is applied no less than it is to counterfeit currency-is no doubt behind
the analogy between queers and counterfeit, something else is doing the work
to shore up the cultural logic that unites counterfeiting and homosexuality. The
slang idiom "queer as a three dollar bill" cannot simply intend to cast the
homosexual as fraudulent in the sense of being deceptive because a queer three
dollar bill presents or announces itself as a fake by virtue of the fact that it is,
after all, a three dollar bill. 3 8 For this reason, to accuse LGBT activists of
attacking the Salvation Army with counterfeit
three dollar bills-as one website
139
did-is a curious, albeit common, slip.

It is worth thinking about the conceptual relationship between queer as
homosexual and queer as counterfeit not just in terms of deceptive imitation,
even though deceptive imitation is very much a concern for same-sex marriage
opponents who routinely talk about same-sex relations in the language of
fraud. 40 Rather, we should think about this conceptual relationship in terms of
the intrinsically non-procreative sexual relations in which queers are presumed
to engage. This notion that sexual minorities are queer as a three dollar bill
because they engage in non-procreative sex not only links up with the
procreation rationale for same-sex marriage prohibitions-insofar as that
rationale rests on the inability of a same-sex couple to cause sexual
procreation-but it also explains at least part of what is driving the current
analogy between same-sex relations and counterfeiting. It also explains, as Part
V will show, the casting of sexual minorities in the contemporary same-sex
marriage debate as individuals who have monetary resources and political
power precisely because they are thought to engage in non-procreative activity.
For this reason, they do not need the protections of the law in the form of
marriage.
During the early-modern period, counterfeiting and sodomy together
figured as unnatural forms of non-procreative exchange. Fisher has noted that a
number of early-modern texts conceptualize sodomy and counterfeiting in
parallel terms. He remarks that "[s]ometimes, the language of counterfeiting is
used to describe a sodomitical relationship ...; sometimes, the sodomite is
actually accused of making false coins .... In [these texts], sodomy and
138. It should be noted, however, that a large volume of genuine three dollar bills were, in
fact, in circulation in the early to mid-nineteenth century. See Fisher, supra note 133, at 1
(citing James R. Toland, Not-So-Phony $3 Bill, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 22, 1976, at 29).
139. See supranotes 126-28 and accompany text (discussing the LGBT Salvation Army
protest).
140.

See infra Part V (discussing deceptive imitation)
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counterfeiting are coterminous."' 41 For instance, in Elizabeth Cary's The
History of the Life, Reign, and Death of Edward 1,142 written in 1680, the
author describes the English King's renowned "sodomitical" tendencies in
subversive numismatic terms. Cary relates that after Edward sent Piers
Gaveston, the Earl of Cornwall and the King's alleged lover, away from the
Court, the King's "wandering eyes [ravaged] through the confines of the great
Court, made loose by his example. Here he seeks out some Piece, or Copper
metal, whom by his Royal stamp he might make current."' 143 Fisher suggests
that Cary's use of numismatic imagery in this passage nicely conveys Edward's
equally injudicious social and sexual transgression. 144 He explains:
[T]he King's transgression here is not so much the stamping itself, but
rather the fact that the minion is not of the proper mettle, or rank. Edward's
actions are imagined as creating disorder because the base (whether metal
or man) is given preferment at the expense of the noble. According to
Cary, Edward makes base social and sexual relations current in the courtthe court is said to be 'made45loose by his example'-just as he makes base
coins current in the realm.
Under Fisher's interpretation, then, Cary deploys the counterfeiting metaphor to
suggest that the King is engaging (or desires to engage) in a form of sexual
exchange, sodomy, that represents a perverse imitation of the true and natural
form of stamping that characterizes both legitimate coining and legitimatei.e., procreative, heterosexual-sex.
The confluence of economic and sexual imagery that marks Elizabeth
Cary's historical account of King Edward II similarly appears in certain
accusations that were hurled at the English playwright, Christopher Marlowe,
by the informer Richard Baines after the former was arrested for atheism in
1593. In a note given to the Privy Council, the group of advisors who worked
closely with Queen Elizabeth, Baines accused Marlowe of holding the
following irreverent views with respect to sodomy and counterfeiting,
respectively: (1) that "St. John the Evangelist was bedfellow to Christ and
141.

Fisher, supra note 133, at 5.

142.
ELIZABETH CARY, THE HISTORY OF THE LIFE, REIGN, AND DEATH OF EDWARD II,
reprinted in 2 THE EARLY MODERN ENGLISHWOMAN: A FACSIMILE LIBRARY OF ESSENTIAL

WORKS, PART I: PRINTED WRITINGS, 1500-1640 (Betty S. Travitsky & Patrick Cullen eds., 1996)
(1627).
143. Id.
144. The stamping of a piece was the "generic term for both coins.., and sexual objects,"
and copper metal was considered to be a "base metal that was specifically associated with the
anus." Fisher, supra note 133, at 5.
145. Id.
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leaned alwaies in his bosome, that he used him as the sinners of Sodoma"; and
(2) that "he [Marlowe] has as good Right to Coine as the Queen of England,
and that... he ment through help of a Cunninge stamp maker to Coin French
Crownes ... and English shillinges."' 146 Baines' characterization of Marlowe's
alleged suggestion that Christ and St. John were lovers-and thus sinned in the
manner of the "sinners of Sodoma"-contains language reminiscent of
monetary exchange, as "to use" was a verb that denoted both expenditure and
sexual intercourse during the Elizabethan period. 47 Conversely, Baines'
characterization of Marlowe's alleged counterfeiting scheme contains language
reminiscent of sexual exchange, as "to stamp" was a verb that denoted both the
minting of coins and procreative sexual intercourse 1 -- the irony here, of
course, being that Marlowe was allegedly promoting non-procreative sexual
acts. Baines's accusatory testimony thus not only suggests that Marlowe
advocated both sodomy and counterfeiting, but also describes Marlowe's
alleged sexual and economic crimes in interchangeable terms.
Just as sodomy (and the sodomite) was figured in subversive numismatic
terms, so, too, was counterfeiting (and the counterfeiter) figured in eroticized
terms-or, at the very least, in terms that suggest that counterfeiting was
thought to be a sexualized sin or crime. One English writer of the early
seventeenth century recounts that the punishment administered to counterfeiters
during that time was to have their "privy members... sund[e]red from [their]
bod[ies]."' 149 Another writer from around that same time observes that the
is, "cutting off... [the]
Normans reserved the same 'punishment-that
genitals-[for] false coyners. 15° In other words, the counterfeiter's
punishment rendered him sterile and thereby placed him in the same position of
castrato that the homosexual symbolically occupied. Moreover, from at least
the early thirteenth century, castration was also a common punishment in
several European countries for men who engaged in sodomy. 151 Where the
146. MARLOWE: THE CRITICAL HERITAGE, 1588-1896, 37 (Millar Maclure ed., 1979).
147. XIX OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 351-52 (2d ed. 1989) (entry for use, v.).
148. XVI OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 481-82 (2d ed. 1989) (entry for stamp, v.); see
also Fisher, supra note 133, at 8-9 (discussing the eroticization of coining language).
149. WILLIAM FULBECKE, A PARALLELE OR CONFERENCE OF THE CMLL LAW, THE CANON
LAW, AND THE COMMON LAW OF THIS REALME OF ENGLAND 89 (London, Wight 1601).
150. WILIAM CAMDEN, REMAINES CONCERNING BRITAINE: BuT ESPECIALLY ENGLAND, AND

THE INHABITANTS THEREOF 169 (London, Waterson 1629).
151. See Jo Ann Hoeppner Moran Cruz, The Roman De La Rose and the ThirteenthCentury Prohibitions of Homosexuality (Oct. 27, 1995) (unpublished paper), available at
http://www.georgetown.edu/labyrinth/conf/cs95/papers/moran.html (noting 13th century laws in
Spain, Portugal, and France that prescribed castration as punishment for sodomy) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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sodomite's punishment was intended to prevent him from having penetrative
sex, however, the counterfeiter's punishment was intended to prevent him
"from sexually reproducing."' 52 On a symbolic level, his punishment
"prevented him from breeding false coins."' 53 Finally, "[a]s the punishment
demonstrates, counterfeiters were imagined to be male, undoubtedly because
the stamping involved in producing coins was itself considered to be analogous
stamping (and hence a
to male penetration. According to this logic, female
54
female counterfeiter) is virtually unthinkable." 1
It bears mention that Dante, the early-modem Italian poet, chose an
historical personage whose name is Master Adam to be his representative
counterfeiter in The Divine Comedy's eighth circle of Hell-the circle where
the fraudulent, including the counterfeiters, are punished. A notorious
counterfeiter of the Florentine florin who was burned alive for his crime in
1281,155 Master Adam's name surely evokes the archetypal Adam whose sin
was at once sexual and symbolically economic. As Nietzsche reminds us, it is
on account of this first man's sexual sin that humanity was forever cast into the
position of a debtor race charged with seeking spiritual redemption.156 I will

return to Dante's punishment of the counterfeiters that appears in Inferno 30 of
The Divine Comedy in order to suggest a connection between the early-modem
treatment of counterfeiting/perverse sexuality and the current representation of
sexual minorities by certain marriage traditionalists in the same-sex marriage
debate.
Based on these select early-modem sources, it would appear that the earlymodem mind conceptualized sodomy as a kind of counterfeiting (and vice
152.
153.
154.

Fisher, supra note 133, at 10.
Id.
Id. at 10 n.42.

155.

DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE DIvINE COMEDY, INFERNO PART 2: COMMENTARY 555

n.61

(Charles S. Singleton trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1970) (c. 1310).
156. See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALITY 62 (Maudemarie Clark
& Alan J. Swensen trans., Hackett Publishing Co. 1998) (1887) (arguing that religion fosters
feelings of guilt in mankind). Nietzsche says:
There can be no doubt: first of all against the "debtor," in whom from this point on
bad conscience, firmly set in him, eating into him and spreading out like a polyp,
grows wide and deep, until finally, with the impossibility of discharging the debt,
people think up the idea of the impossibility of removing the penance, the idea that
the debt cannot be paid off (eternal punishment). Finally however, those ideas of
"debt" and "duty" turn back even against the "creditor." People should, in this
matter, now think about the causa prima [first cause] of humanity, about the
beginning of the human race, about their ancestor who from now on is loaded down
with a curse ("Adam," "original sin," "no freedom for the will") ....
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versa) for two interrelated reasons, each of which highlights the non-procreative
attributes of the former.
First, sodomy and counterfeiting together represented unnatural and
perverted imitations of production-biological reproduction and
economic/monetary production, respectively. If sodomy was unnatural because
it was a form of sex that took place outside the conventional context of marital
procreation, counterfeiting was unnatural because it was a form of coining that
took place outside the conventional context of economic production. On a
certain level, it made perfect sense for early-modem writers to describe sodomy
in subversive numismatic terms, as the art of coining mimicked the biological,
reproductive process. The act of coining, which involved the stamping or
imprinting of the monarch on a piece of metal, was "similar to the generational
act as understood within Aristotelian reproductive biology: The active male
form impressing itself on female matter."' 157 Any stamping and generation of
coins that occurred in the absence of regal (and therefore divine) authority was
therefore no less perverse, and no more naturally procreative, than sodomy
itself. Just as the counterfeiter arrogated to himself the King's (or the state's)
prerogative of defining the manner in which money was bred and thus of
ensuring the proper transmission of currency, the sodomite arrogated to himself
God's (or Nature's) prerogative of defining the manner in which sex occurred
and thus of ensuring the proper transmission of life. Both the counterfeiter and
the sodomite, then, not only disrespected God's process, so to speak, but also
generated mere excess-the counterfeit coin and non-procreative semen,
respectively.
Second, sodomy and counterfeiting represented not only uneconomical
distortions of the natural procreative process, but also an unnatural union and
generation of similar (or externally identical) entities: Two same-sex persons
and counterfeit money, respectively. For the early-modem-and, as Part V
demonstrates, the contemporary-mind, same-sex relations and counterfeiting
equally represented a non-procreative, narcissistic, and avaricious passion for
sameness. Just as same-sex marriage opponents today have highlighted the
fraudulent aspects of joining together two identical identities that cannot
procreate,' 8 so, too, did early-modem thinkers conceptualize counterfeiting as
an unnatural breeding of the same and a narcissistic obsession with the same.
157. Fisher, supranote 133, at 9.
158. See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text (explicating the argument that
nonprocreative partnerships cannot constitute marriages). One might also here recall Glen
Lavy's statement that "[i]t
takes sodium and chloride to make salt. If you add sodium to
sodium, you don't have salt. If you add chloride to chloride, you don't have salt ....It takes a
man and a woman to make babies." Foust, supra note 115.
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At this point, this Article returns to Dante's treatment of the counterfeiters
that appears in The Divine Comedy, specifically their association with
narcissism. The symbolic representation of counterfeiters that appears in that
text is instructive because it highlights just that aspect of counterfeiting that
often goes unnoticed-its narcissistic qualities-but that nonetheless renders it
a suitable analogy to same-sex relations in the eyes of same-sex marriage
opponents. As Part V will explore at length, Dante's suggestion that sterile
counterfeiters both generate and accumulate excess in a narcissistic and
avaricious manner corresponds to the contemporary framing of sexual
minorities as an intra-relationally sterile class that selfishly and narcissistically
accumulates tangible resources and economic power, which, in turn,
supposedly justifies receipt of less legal protection than other minority groups.
The twin images of the homosexual as non-procreative sodomite and the
homosexual as greedy narcissist not only figure implicitly in Justice Scalia's
Romer v. Evans dissent, where an image of the homosexual as counterfeiter
appeared for the first time in constitutional jurisprudence, 5 9 but also play a
dominant role in shoring up the procreation rationale for same-sex marriage
prohibitions today. Understanding the connection between economic fraud and
homosexuality that Dante nicely elucidates for us is critical to seeing just how
much the procreation rationale is about sodomy, fraud, and the disgust that both
elicit.
Dante's allusion to two Ovidian figures who harbored an unnatural
obsession for similitude-Myrrha and Narcissus-in the same canto where
Dante depicts the counterfeiters is surely no accident. Early in canto 30 of the
Inferno, Dante is informed by one of the damned that Myrrha, Ovid's infamous
daughter who tricked her father into having sex with her by impersonating
someone else, resides in the eighth circle of hell along with the counterfeiters
because she "contrived to sin with [her father] ..

.

, counterfeiting in herself

another's person."' 160 Later in that same canto, Dante alludes to Narcissus when
Master Adam tells another falsifier, Sinon, who is parched with thirst, that
"thou hast burning fever and aching head and wouldst need little persuasion to
lap Narcissus' mirror."' 161 Master Adam's reference to Narcissus's mirror is, of
course, an allusion to the legendary Greek youth who fell in love with his own
reflection and who was punished accordingly when the gods turned him into
the flower now known as the narcissus.
159. See infranotes 222-25 and accompanying text (arguing that Scalia's focus on gay and
lesbians' wealth and political power evokes the early-modem image of the narcissistic
counterfeiter).
160. DANTE, supra note 155, at 373.
161. Id. at 377.
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The allusions to Myrrha and Narcissus in a canto devoted to the sins of
counterfeiting specifically, and falsification more generally, are neither casual
nor superfluous. Quite the contrary, Myrrha and Narcissus epitomize the same
unnatural sexual desire for, and cultivation of, similitude that the sins (and
crimes) of counterfeiting and homosexuality symbolically represented.
Myrrha's incestuous desire for her father places her in a position that
corresponds to both the counterfeiter and the sodomite, as her counterfeiting
involves a non-normative sexual relationship that not only conjoins two similar
entities, but does so in a way that is thought to pervert nature's conventional
procreative process. As I have argued elsewhere, part of the reason why incest
and homosexuality are so often linked on the proverbial slippery slope from
same-sex marriage to incest 162 is because an incestuous relationship is like a
same-sex relationship in this sense.
Similarly, Narcissus's autoeroticism (and latent homosexuality) 163 links
him to the counterfeiters, sodomites, and incestuous in two related ways. First,
his unnatural desire for himself locks him into an entirely self-reflexive mode of
exchange. Second, that mode of exchange represents a perversion-indeed, a
refutation--of nature's procreative process.
Ovid makes explicit that
Narcissus's flaw is at once a sexual and an economic one by using monetary
language to characterize his denial of the nymph, Echo, with whom he might
have had a natural, procreative sexual relationship. When Echo, whose fate of
quite literally becoming an echo mirrors that of her beloved and involves a
replication of the same that evokes all of the crimes here discussed, beseeches
Narcissus, Narcissus flees and says: "May I die before my riches [copia] is
yours. ' 164 Narcissus here uses the word "copia" to convey the "riches" that he
would like to keep for himself rather than share with Echo. In so doing, Ovid
suggests that Narcissus's sexual spurning of her is tantamount to a miserly and
excessive accumulation of wealth. The Latin word, "copia," denotes abundance
or plenty 165 and was the name given to the Roman goddess of abundance
(Copia), who was identified iconographically by her cornucopia, or horn of
plenty-the same horn that was imprinted on coinage during the reign of
Emperor Claudius II and that appeared in the hand of Aequitas, a minor
162. Cahill, supra note 10, at 1543.
163. See, e.g., Marta Powell Harley, Narcissus, Hernaphroditus,and Attis: Ovidian
Lovers at the Fontained'Amors in Guillaume de Lorris 's Roman de la rose, PMLA 324, 33134 (1986) (considering the implications of the myth's suggestions of homosexuality).
164. OvID,THE METAMORPHOSES (Frank Justus Miller trans., Loeb Classical Library 3d ed.
1977)(1916).
165. Latin Dictionary and Grammar Aid, http://archives.nd.edu/latgramm.htm (last visited
Feb. 5, 2007) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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goddess of fair trade and honest merchants. 166 Ovid's use of this term that both
symbolically represented money and at one time appeared on money nicely
captures the veritable greed that self-love signifies. Indeed, at the very moment
that Narcissus realizes that it is himself with whom he has fallen in love, he
laments his fate by once again using the language of copia: "What I desire, 67i
have; the very abundance of my riches beggars me [inopem me copia fecit]."'
Here, Ovid strategically places two words that derive from the same root"ops," which means riches, goods, abundance, or plenty 168-in a chiastic poetic
structure 16 9 in order to convey the painful double bind in which Narcissus is
trapped: Already possessing that which he cannot truly have. As this Article
will show, the legal discourse surrounding same-sex marriage prohibitions, as
well as the procreation rationale for those prohibitions, place sexual minorities
in a strikingly similar double bind.
Ovid's use of economic language to describe an erotic situation that is at
once non-procreative, miserly, and bankrupt did not escape the attention of
Dante, who was most certainly aware of the Roman poet's economic spin on
the Greek legend when he chose to include Narcissus among the counterfeiters
in canto 30 of the Inferno. There is another reason, however, why Dante likely
found Narcissus to be a suitable figure for a canto about falsification generally,
and counterfeiting in particular. Here, we must return to the language that
Narcissus uses to describe the paradoxical (and painfully intractable) situation
in which he finds himself. The same Latin word that denotes material
abundance, copia, also denotes a copy or imitation-as the English "copy"
derives from the Latin copia.170 In this sense, Narcissus quite literally falls in
love with a copy or counterfeit of himself when he gazes admiringly upon his
reflection in a pool of water-a copiawhich, in turn, he keeps to himself rather
than exchange it with the outside world. Dante therefore intimates that those
who erotically desire a likeness or copy ofthemselves-Myrrha, Narcissus, and
166.

Sarah Blake Wilk, Donatello's Dovizia as an Image of Florentine Political

Propaganda,7 ARTIBUS ET HISTORIAE 9, 19 n.29 (1986) (describing the items that appear on a
silver denerius).
167. OVID, supra note 164. An English translation that more closely tracks the Latin
would be: my riches beggarly make me (my translation).
168. Latin Dictionary and Grammar Aid, supra note 165.
169. The Oxford English Dictionarydefines chiasmus as "a grammatical figure by which
the order of words in one of two parallel clauses is inverted in the other." III OXFORD ENGLISH
DicTnONARY 103 (2d ed. 1989) (entry for chiasmus, n.). An example of chiasmus is John F.
Kennedy's "ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for your country."
170. According to the Oxford EnglishDictionary,the English word, copy, derives from the
Latin copia. In addition, the Dictionary's first definition for "copy" is "plenty, abundance, a
copious quantity." Id.at 915-16 (entry for copy, n.).
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the homosexual that Narcissus symbolized for early-modem readers- 7'are
self-counterfeiting in a way that recalls the counterfeiter's unnatural and
avaricious breeding of monetary copies. Part V will demonstrate that the
current analogy between same-sex relations and counterfeiting, as well as the
procreation rationale itself, similarly reflect a belief that gays and lesbians are
ultimately sterile and narcissistic, and, as such, uneconomical. Recent
procreationist rhetoric is therefore in some very real sense a case of Narcissus
redux and of history, and myth, repeating itself.
B. Miscegenation and Counterfeiting
The current deployment of counterfeiting rhetoric in the same-sex
marriage debate also recalls the legal deployment of counterfeiting language in
the mid-nineteenth century to describe mixed-race individuals who passed for
white. This historical parallel to the contemporary framing of same-sex
relations as counterfeit is useful because it offers a way to connect
miscegenation and same-sex marriage on a substantive level in a way that the
structural miscegenation
analogy to sexual orientation discrimination has
172
largely overlooked.
The miscegenation parallel, moreover, makes a great
deal of sense in this particular context by virtue of the fact that counterfeiting
terminology is implicit in the very language of racial and sexual orientation
passing. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the act of deceiving
another person with counterfeit is technically referred to as "passing
counterfeit" or "to pass counterfeit." 73 The act of presenting oneself as white,
74
or straight, to the public is also, of course, routinely referred to as passing. 1
171. See supra note 163 and accompanying text (commenting on Narcissus' latent
homosexuality).
172. For the sexual orientation-race analogy, see generally Siobhan B. Somerville, Queer
Loving, 11 GLQ: A J. OF GAY AND LESBIAN STUD. 335 (2005); Marc Spindelman, Reorienting
Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 N.C. L. REv. 359, 430-46 (2001) (discussing the analogy and its
criticisms); Andrew Koppelman, Why DiscriminationAgainst Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex
Discrimination,69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 197,202 (1994) (discussing the taboo against homosexuality
and the taboo against miscegenation in analogous terms); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 63
(Haw. 1993) (finding that Hawaii's same-sex marriage prohibition constituted an impermissible
form of sex discrimination under the state constitution and comparing that prohibition to the
criminal miscegenation statute at issue in Loving v. Virginia).
173. XI OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 307-08 (2d ed. 1989) (entry for passing, v.).
174. See, e.g., RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY,
AND ADOPTION 283 (2003) (defining passing as "a deception that enables a person to adopt
specific roles or identities from which he or she would otherwise be barred by prevailing social
standards"); Yoshino, supranote 3, at 839 (discussing passing in the sexual orientation context).
I should preface this brief overview of counterfeiting and miscegenation by recognizing that it
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Counterfeiting analogies appear in nineteenth-century cases to denote
mixed-race passing as well as fugitive slaves who escaped from a slave-holding
into a free state. In one case, State v. Anderson,' 75 the Supreme Court of
Missouri considered whether the court below erred when it allowed the jury in
a rape prosecution to determine the race of the victim, as well as the status and
race of the defendant, merely by looking at them in court and by hearing
testimony that the latter was a slave.' 76 In that case, the defendant, "a negro
slave,"'177 was indicted for "attempt[ing] to ravish a white female,"'I7 8 a crime
that carried higher penalties than had the defendant been, and the victim not
been, white. The defendant objected to the trial court's jury instructions on the
ground that they permitted the jury to determine the "color, sex and race of the
prosecuting witness and the defendant" 179 merely on the basis of sight and on
proof that the defendant was a slave. The trial court, however, refused his
objections and the jury returned a verdict of guilty and a sentence of
castration.18° In upholding the trial court's ruling, the Supreme Court of
Missouri noted that the defendant's attorneys made the following argument on
appeal:
The averments in the indictment, that the prosecutrix was a white female,
and the defendant a negro, were material and had to be proved.... The
court erred in telling the jury they might find that the prosecutrix was a
white female, from seeing her on the witness stand, and that the defendant
was a negro, from seeing him in court, and proof that he was a slave. If this
be law, then it would be proper in a larceny case to instruct the jury that
they might find the material fact of value from seeing the article, or in a
case of passing counterfeit money, that the money was counterfeit or

genuinefrom seeing it in court .... Under the statute, the question before
the jury was not merely one of color, but of race. Such questions are often
of the greatest difficulty, requiring for their solution scientific skill. There
represents a very narrow contribution to the ample academic literature that already exists on the
sexual orientation/race analogy specifically and on the legal treatment of miscegenation more
generally. See generally WERNER SOLLORS, NEITHER BLACKNOR WHITE YET BOTH: THEMATIC
EXPLORATIONS OF INTERRACIAL LITERATURE (1997) (describing the use of the term "passing" in
the context of crossing a line that divides two groups); PETER BARDAGuO, RECONSTRUCTING THE
HOUSEHOLD:

FAMILIES, SEX AND THE LAW IN THE NNETEENTH-CENTURY

SOUTH (1995);

Josephine Ross, The Sexualization of Difference: A Comparison of Mixed-Race and SameGender Marriage,37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 255 (2002).
175. State v. Anderson, 19 Mo. 241 (1853).
176. See id. at 242 (describing the proceedings below).
177. Id. at 241.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 243.
180. State v. Anderson, 19 Mo. 241, 242 (1853) (describing the outcome of the trial).
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are albinoes, mulattoes, and quadroons, who excel Caucasians in whiteness
of skin. Yet, before the jury could convict the defendant, it was necessary
that they should find that he was a negro, and the prosecutrix a Caucasian.
These facts they could only find upon proof.... Slavery does not raise the
legal presumption of black color, although the converse is true.181
It was therefore the defendant's contention on appeal that, just as the state
would have to prove that money was truly counterfeit before ajury could find a
defendant guilty of passing counterfeit money, so, too, must the state prove,
with "scientific skill," 82 that the defendant was truly black. Perhaps more
important, the state must also prove that the victim was truly white-and not,
like counterfeit money, someone (a "mulatto" or a "quadroon") who was
83
passing for white. 1
Similar counterfeiting rhetoric appears in State v. Jacobs,184 in which the
Supreme Court of North Carolina considered whether a lower court erred when
it permitted a slave-owning witness to testify for the state in a criminal case as
an expert on "the effect of the intermixture of negro or African blood with that
of other races.' 85 In that case, the defendant was tried for carrying firearms as
a "free negro," defined statutorily as "one who is 'descended from negro
ancestors to the fourth generation inclusive, though one ancestor of each
generation may have been a white person.' He may, therefore, be a person
who... has only a sixteenth part of African blood in his veins."'' 8 6 To
determine whether the defendant was a "free negro" (or whether he was
"white") under the statute, the prosecution called a witness to testify as an
expert in "the intermixture of negro or African blood with the white and Indian
races," 87 specifically, a slave owner who claimed expertise in "distinguish[ing]
between the descendants of a negro and a white person, and the descendants of
a negro and Indian; and further, [who claimed] that he could ... say whether a
person was full African or negro, or had more or less half negro or African
blood in him."' 188 To that end, the witness testified that, in his opinion, "the
189
defendant was what is called a mulatto-that is, half African and half white,"'
and therefore a "free negro" under the terms of the criminal statute.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 243-44 (first emphasis added).
Id. at 243.
See id. (describing defendant's argument on appeal).

184.

State v. Jacobs, 51 N.C. (1 Jones Eq.) 282 (1859).

185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 282.
Id. at 286 (citations omitted).
Id. at 282.
Id. at 283.

189.

State v. Jacobs, 51 N.C. (1 Jones Eq.) 282, 283 (1859).
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In upholding the lower court's decision to admit the testimony as expert
evidence,1 90 the Supreme Court of North Carolina remarked that:
[I]t appears to be admitted that the opinion of witnesses, possessing
peculiar skill, is admissible whenever the subject matter of inquiry is such
that inexperienced persons are unlikely to prove capable of forming a
correct judgment upon it without such assistance.... In support of the
principles thus announced, it has been decided that seal-engravers may be
called to give their opinion upon an impression, whether it was made from
an original seal, or from another impression .... So, the opinion of an
artist in painting is evidence of the genuineness of a picture ....

It has

been said that the genuineness of a post-mark may be proved by the opinion
of one who has been in the habit of receiving letters with that mark ....
Merchants and bankers, who are daily engaged in handling the notes of
particularbanks, andhave thus become thoroughly acquaintedwith their
whole appearance,may prove whether a particularnote is genuine or

counterfeit .... Many other instances of the application of the principle
might be given, but those to which we have referred are sufficient to show
that it is extensive enough to embrace the case now before us. The effect of
the intermixture of the blood of different races of people is surely a matter
of science, and may be learned by observation and study. Nor does it
require a distinguished comparative anatomist to detect the
19 admixture of the
African or Indian with the pure blood of the white race. 1
Like the Anderson court, the Jacobs court analogized the "science" of
determining race--or, more specifically, the difference between "admixture"
and purity-to the science of determining the difference between a genuine and
a fraudulent banknote. In so doing, it suggested that a mixed-race person that
passed for a white person was tantamount to a counterfeit note that passed for
an authentic one.
The counterfeiting language that appears in these nineteenth-century cases
that struggled with the anxiety-provoking question of racial purity-both in
theory and in fact-is surely no accident, as the very crime of passing
counterfeit captured on a linguistic level what was so disturbing about multiracial passing on both an ideological and a material level. Beyond the linguistic
connection that counterfeiting and multi-racial passing share, however, the idea
that non-whites were analogous to fraudulent currency surely made sense to a
legal (and cultural) regime that treated non-whites as a form of property. 192 In
this sense, the counterfeiting analogy to multi-racial passing was not just an
190. Id.
191. Id. at 283-84 (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added).
192. For a related phenomenon-the idea ofwhiteness as property-see generally Cheryl I.
Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1707 (1993).
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analogy but rather a different way of denoting the commercialization of one's
personhood that the institution of slavery represented. Thus, it was not at all
strange for a federal district court in Pennsylvania to reason that, under the
United States Constitution, a slave owner from one state had the right to
recover his slave, who had absconded to another state, by using "every art,
device or stratagem to decoy the slave into his power" because "[i]t is every
day's practice to detect counterfeiters, and those who pass counterfeit money,
by employing persons to purchase it from them."
Here, the court's
characterization of the plaintiff's slave, who had temporarily taken up residence
with the defendant as "a runaway slave,"' 94 as counterfeit currency is not just
metaphorical. To the contrary, the slave, quite literally the property or
currency--or, what historian Nell Irvin Painter has nicely termed the
"embodied currency"195--of the plaintiff-slave owner, is attempting to selfcounterfeit, or pass, as free in a way that would compromise the plaintiff-slave
owner's aggregate wealth. The court therefore deployed a commercial
metaphor to capture the truly commercial interests that were at stake in that
case.
The historical analogy between counterfeiting and miscegenation not only
projected an image of the slave (or multi-racial person) as currency, but also
reflected a more deep-seated concern over the relationship between money and
racial equality--one that became especially current after the Civil War. If,
before the Civil War, counterfeiting rhetoric captured the extent to which nonwhites (including, of course, those who might pass for white) were embodied
currency, after the Civil War counterfeiting rhetoric captured the fear
surrounding social amalgamation. Historian Michael O'Malley has explored
the extent to which "[e]ssentialism-the search for fundamental, intrinsic,
'essential' categories of being or laws of nature--characterized much of
nineteenth-century public discourse" centering on race and money.196
197
O'Malley argues that the intense anxiety over the production of greenbacks
193. Johnson v. Tompkins, 13 F.Cas. 840, 843 (C.C.A. Pa. 1833).
194. Id. at 841.
195. Nell Irvin Painter, ThinkingAbout the Languages ofMoney andRace: A Response to
Michael O'Malley, "Specie and Species," 99 AHR FORuM 396, 398 (1994).
196. Michael O'Malley, Specie andSpecies: Race and the Money Question in NineteenthCentury America, 99 AHR FORUM 369, 369 (1994).
197. "Greenback" was the name given to bank notes issued by Northern banks during the
Civil War. Greenbacks were not backed by precious metal (gold and silver) and thus tied to the
gold standard, but rather derived their value by virtue of the fact that Congress approved their
issuance under the National Banking Act of 1863. O'Malley observes that "[t]he Union issued
$450 million in 'legal tender' greenbacks during the Civil War. Backed by nothing more than
federal authority, the notes had no intrinsic value. Under the National Banking Act of 1863, the
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and similar counterfeit' 98 currency during both the Civil War and the
Reconstruction periods reflected an anxiety over Northerners' use of
"greenback dollars to help form biracial governments."' 99 Although greenbacks
were authorized by the federal government, their critics often conceptualized
them as an inferior substitute or counterfeit of real money, that is, currency tied
to the gold standard.2 °° Similarly, although newly freed slaves were rendered
equal to whites by the Fourteenth Amendment, critics of racial equality often
conceptualized them as an inferior substitute of a real person, that is, one whose
identity was tied to the white standard.20 '
Most interestingly, O'Malley observes that the two, greenbacks and the
newly-freed slaves, inspired similar and coterminous fears over "the instability
of value and identity in American society. 20 2 Critics of greenbacks and racial
equality contended that the former would help to achieve the latter, even as the
value of both was derived through artificial means-namely, congressional
legislation and the Constitution, respectively. O'Malley explains:
Deploring greenbacks, Henry Adams called "the law of legal tender ...an
attempt by artificial legislation to make something true which was false."
Just as no legal enactment could create value, no government could affect
the Negro's nature. "No legislation of Congress can elevate or improve the
physical, moral or intellectual condition of the negro," maintained Senator
George Vickers of Maryland in 1869. "We cannot legislate into them any
fitness or qualifications which they do not now possess... ."[By contrast,
f]rom the greenback perspective, a legal declaration of equality, an
expression ofpolitical or cultural authority, could bring about equality just
as a congressional declaration of the value of paper money could give the
paper value.20 3
Similarly, "[g]reenbacks symbolized the power of government to overturn the
natural law arguments that justified slavery. ,2 04 This notion that the
Union also taxed state bank notes out of existence, creating a uniform currency for the first
time ....Practically from the date of issue, the greenbacks began depreciating relative to gold."
Id. at 378.
198. Greenbacks were not technically counterfeit because they were issued under federal
authority. Nevertheless, because "Northerners ...used greenback dollars to help form biracial
governments," greenbacks came to be associated with counterfeit currency-as "the enterprise
of African-American equality [was connected to] fraudulent or counterfeit bills." Id. at 377.
199. Id.
200. See id. (noting the dubious character of greenbacks during Reconstruction).
201. O'Malley, supranote 196, at 377 (drawing a parallel between money and race).
202. Id. at 375.
203. Id.at 378-79.
204. Id. at 383.
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government cannot legislate value, be it of money or of people, into existence
was surely behind the Supreme Court's majority opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson,
where the Court noted that "[1]egislation is powerless to eradicate racial
instincts or to abolish distinctions based upon physical differences. ' ,20 5 While
the Fourteenth Amendment might have granted Plessy legitimacy in the form of
citizenship, and while Plessy might have passed for white, his passing was
deemed no more legitimate than the passing of counterfeit currency. This
notion that artificial legislation cannot transform a counterfeit into the real thing
is also behind, as the next Part shows, the idea that the law simply cannot, and
should not, alter the true face of marriage by recognizing same-sex marriage.
Although O'Malley focuses on the distinctly economic consequences of
racial equality, we should also think about the distinctly economic
consequences of miscegenation. Above, it was suggested that counterfeiting
analogies from the early to mid-nineteenth century revealed the extent to which
slaves, and non-whites more generally, were conceptualized as a form of
embodied currency in order to capture the truly economic interests at stake in
institutionalized slavery. It is also worth considering, however, the extent to
which miscegenation, both before but more notably after the Civil War, was
thought to produce a counterfeit product that, in turn, posed a uniquely
economic threat. Indeed, what would happen if a master's child-slaves, once
free and no longer considered to be a part of his property, laid claim to his
property? Or, to project forward through time, what would happen if Mildred
and Richard Loving had a child-a "mongrel breed," as the Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals in Naim v. Naim20 6 described it-who then laid claim to
Richard's estate, a property right that would be especially problematic if
Richard had "non-mongrel" children from a prior marriage in a state that did
not recognize interracial marriage (which he did not) who also laid claim to his
property? While the possibilities are endless and surely beyond the scope of
this Article, suffice it to say here that miscegenation was thought to produce a
counterfeit product that, in turn, raised serious inheritance, that is, serious
economic, concerns as well as serious social concerns. In Brewer's Lessee v.
Blougher,2 °7 the Supreme Court of the United States captured just this
economic parade of horribles that the anti-miscegenation laws were intended to
prevent. At issue in that case was an 1852 Maryland statute that would allow

205. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896). O'Malley discusses Plessy v.
Fergusonin similar terms. See O'Malley, supra note 196, at 395 (discussing Plessy).
206. Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955) (upholding Virginia's antimiscegenation statute).
207. Brewer's Lessee v. Blougher, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 178 (1840).
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even "bastard" children to inherit property from their mother. 20 8 While the
Supreme Court upheld the statute on federalism grounds, an attorney attempted
to convince it otherwise by arguing that, if "bastards of colour [who] mingled
with whites" were allowed to inherit under state statute, then "in such a state of
illegitimacy, how could persons and families proceeding from [the same]
female, as the root, establish their right to inherit any estate from each
other?, 20 9 Counterfeit persons therefore confused social roles in a way that had
material, economic consequences.
This Article suggests that both counterfeiting rhetoric and the procreation
rationale for same-sex marriage prohibitions are, on a symbolic level, repeating
the history of racial miscegenation. To be sure, same-sex marriage advocates,
and some courts, have long recognized the structural similarities between race
and sexual orientation discrimination from a doctrinal standpoint. Moreover, in
some instances, the miscegenation analogy has proven quite successful as a
litigation strategy. 210 Nevertheless, because commentators have focused almost
exclusively on the similarities between racial and sexual orientation
discrimination,they have missed the more substantive connections that exist
between the practice of miscegenation and same-sex procreation per se. This
Part suggests that courts are increasingly talking about same-sex procreation as
a kind of miscegenation unto itself, one that will inalterably change the face, or
physiognomy, of the original marriage model and that also raises the specter of
economic fraud.
V. The Legacy of the CounterfeitingAnalogy in the Same-Sex Marriage
Debate: Narcissus andMiscegenation Revisited
How does the history behind the counterfeiting analogy help us to
understand the current deployment of counterfeiting rhetoric in the same-sex
marriage debate? More important, how does it clarify the work that the
procreation rationale is doing in shoring up same-sex marriage prohibitions
today? This Part explores and answers these questions by looking more closely
at the way in which history is repeating itself on two levels. First, Section A
uses the historical casting of sodomy as counterfeit to explain why nonprocreative sex is such a concern for marriage traditionalists and for many
208. Id. at 197.
209. Id. at 198.
210. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 63 (Haw. 1993) (holding that Hawaii's same-sex
marriage prohibition constituted a gender classification under the state constitution and
comparing that prohibition to the criminal miscegenation statute at issue in Loving).
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courts, namely, because it allows those who engage in same-sex conduct, a
counterfeit form of the cross-sex model, to acquire riches and political power
that the rest of the population lacks. Because same-sex couples therefore have
more political clout, they need less by way of legal protection. In this sense,
same-sex couples are modem avatars of Narcissus-simultaneously having too
much and not enough. Section B uses the historical casting of miscegenation as
counterfeit to explain why same-sex families are such a concern for marriage
traditionalists and for many courts, namely, because artificial reproductive
technology is allowing them to pass for the real marriage archetype. In this
sense, same-sex couples are repeating the crime of miscegenation by engaging
in an artificial form of procreation that attempts to pass itself off as the real
thing.
A. The Power of Non-ProcreativeSex: Narcissus Redux
The early-modem treatment of sodomy and counterfeiting (both together
and singly) helps to explain the contemporary framing of the same-sex marriage
debate as well as the legal treatment of same-sex marriage prohibitions in at
least three interrelated ways. It should be noted here that this Article is not
suggesting that either contemporary counterfeiting rhetoric or the procreation
rationale flow consciously and deliberately from, say, Ovid and Dante. Rather,
that the counterfeiting analogy and the procreation rationale are better
understood in light of the procreative logic that underlies both, and that the
early-modem treatment of sodomy and counterfeiting helps to elucidate that
logic. To rely on Professor Yoshino's larger project in Suspect Symbols, the
symbol of the counterfeiter that emerges from Dante's economic casting of the
Narcissus myth provides a "thicker response" to the procreation rationale for
same-sex marriage prohibitions than strictly legal criticisms of that rationale
have permitted.2 1 '
First, and as discussed at greater length above, sodomy and counterfeiting
were considered to be analogous modes of exchange that did not follow
nature's/the state's procreative process. If the latter represented a perverse
imitation of the way in which the state naturally bred or procreated currency,
the former was arguably worse because it did not guarantee any procreation
even though it was an equally perverse imitation of the way in which a crosssex couple reproduced. This early-modem notion that sodomy amounts to
counterfeit because it is non-procreative conforms to the contemporary framing
211. See Yoshino, supra note 1, at 1756 (discussing the role of symbols in strengthening
the argument for heightened protection of sexual minorities under the Equal Protection Clause).
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of same-sex marriage as counterfeit on account of the fact that it is not
"inherently procreative. ' , 21 2 To recall the remarks of one same-sex marriage
opponent: "Same-sex marriages are counterfeit, immoral, totally sterile, lacking
the No. 1 reason for marriage-procreation-ignoring the wisdom of ages and
213
common sense."
Second, and relatedly, early-modem sources suggest that non-procreative
sodomy represented a threat to the continuity of the state no less than
counterfeiting represented a threat to the continuity of the state's currency. In
his examination of sodomy and male homosexuality in Renaissance England,
Sodometries: Renaissance Texts, Modern Sexualities, Jonathan Goldberg has
observed that "sodomy is, as a sexual act, anything that threatens alliance-any
sexual act, that is, that does not promote the aims of married procreative
2 14
sex."
As the term [sodomy] was repeatedly invoked and came to take on a whole
variety of linked but distinct meanings, those meanings always operated by
an analogy, however distant, to the original notion of the sodomite as a
destroyer of that most basic 215
unit of the social fabric, the procreative,
married, heterosexual couple.
These sources therefore reveal not only the extent to which the counterfeiting
analogy reflects a fear about procreation, but also why the non-procreative
attributes of sodomy pose such a threat-namely, because of their capacity to
undermine "that most basic unit of the social fabric, the procreative, married,
heterosexual couple., 2 16 The procreation rationale for same-sex marriage
prohibitions similarly rests on this idea that same-sex relationships (and their
intrinsic non-procreativity) threaten to destroy this "most basic unit of the social
fabric., 2 17 As Justice Cordy reasoned in his Goodridge dissent: "[A] society
without the institution of marriage, in which heterosexual intercourse,
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http://www.ccrl.ca/index.php?id=122 (last visited Feb. 5, 2007) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
213. Morton James, Letter to the Editor, Same-Sex MarriageIs No Marriageat All, CHI.
DAILY HERALD, Apr. 25, 2004, at 17, availableat 2004 WLNR 5637560.
214. JONATHAN GOLDBERG, SODOMETRIES: RENAISSANCE TEXTS, MODERN SEXUALITIES 19
(1992).
215. Jody Greene, "You Must Eat Men": The Sodomitic Economy of Renaissance
Patronage,1 GLQ: A J. OF LESBIAN AND GAY STUD. 163, 166 (1994).
216. See id. (discussing the origins of the idea of the sodomite as a destroyer of social
capital).
217. Id.
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and child care are largely disconnected processes, would be
procreation,
2 18
chaotic.
Third, and perhaps most important here, the early-modem notion that
counterfeiters are uneconomical narcissists conforms to the contemporary
framing of gays and lesbians as selfish and narcissistic because of the nonprocreative homosexual conduct in which they are presumptively thought to
engage. Rhetorical and legal claims centering on the alleged narcissism and
affluence of gays and lesbians have assumed a variety of forms, some more
incendiary than others. For instance, sexual minorities have at times been
accused of being narcissists (or narcissistic) because they are thought to flout
certain religious and moral tenets in favor of an alternative "lifestyle" that runs
directly counter to those tenets. As Pat Robertson, founder of the Christian
Coalition of America, recently remarked: "[Homosexuals are] self-absorbed
narcissists who are willing to destroy any institution so long as they can have
affirmation of their lifestyle."2 19 Or, in the words of the Family Research
Council: "The activist homosexual agenda and worldview are fundamentally
incompatible with Christianity or any form of true religion, because
narcissism. It denies the nature of our bodies and
homosexuality is ultimately
220
the nature of our spirits."
More often than not, however, the language of narcissism and avarice is
less inflammatory and ironically appears to cast sexual minorities/same-sex
couples in a positive light with respect to their enhanced economic resources.
Justice Scalia's insistent focus in his Romer dissent on gays and lesbians' socalled "disproportionate political power" and "high disposable income"-the
former of which is likely a consequence of the latter, in his estimation, and both
of which militate against enhanced judicial protection for sexual minoritiesevokes the early-modem image of the sterile, narcissistic, and avaricious
counterfeiter.2 21 In his words:
218. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 996 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J.,
dissenting).
219. Robertson: Gays andLesbians Are "Self-AbsorbedNarcissists"ResponsibleForNoFault Divorce and Abortion, MEDiAMATrERS FOR AMERICA, Aug. 17, 2005, available at

http://mediamatters.org/items/200508170006 (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
220. Robert E. Ritchie, ProtestandReparationin Manhattan,The Am. Soc'y for the Def.
of Tradition, Family and Prop., (Sept.-Oct. 1998) available at http://www.tfp.org/anf/anti_
blasphemy/corpus.htm (remarks of Steve Schwalm) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
221. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 647 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's
casting of "homosexuals" as a "politically powerful minority" that aggregates in powerful subcommunities which facilitate political mobilization, represents an inversion of the relationship
between minority status (and the conditions that ordinarily flow from it) and political power as
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The problem (a problem, that is, for those who wish to retain social
disapprobation of homosexuality) is that, because those who engage in
homosexual conduct tend to reside in disproportionate numbers in certain
communities ....have high disposable income,... and, of course, care
about homosexual-rights issues much more ardently than the public at
large, they possess political power much greater than their numbers, both
locally and statewide. Quite understandably, they devote this political
a grudging social toleration, but full social
power to achieving not merely222
acceptance, of homosexuality.
Justice Scalia here relies on what has come to be known as the "myth of gay
affluence,, 223 that is, the widely-held belief that sexual minorities have more
money and consequently more political power than the public at large-the
"public," like the "seemingly tolerant Coloradans" in Romer, whose "modest"
attempts at lawmaking are outweighed by the mobilization of a "politically
powerful minority.,

224

This myth of gay affluence or gay narcissism, which has enjoyed some
225
success in the courts, casts gays and lesbians in a role not unlike that reserved
for the early-modem counterfeiter. The myth not only promotes the idea that
sexual minorities are greedy and narcissistic as compared to the modest citizens
who possess relatively less political power and fewer resources, but also
highlights the non-procreative conduct in which they presumptively engagethe same non-procreative (read: counterfeit) conduct which, in turn, leads to
the selfish accumulation of wealth. More specifically, Justice Scalia suggests
that a causal link exists among sexual minorities' non-procreative homosexual
conduct, high disposable income, and rather immodest political power. In this
sense, the myth of gay affluence rests on the same logic as does the
counterfeiting analogy itself: Sex that represents an uneconomical, narcissistic,
set forth in U.S. v. CaroleneProducts,304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
dissenting). Justice Scalia continued,
222. Romer, 517 U.S. at 645-46 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
stating that "[t]he constitutional amendment before us here is not the manifestation of a
'bare... desire to harm' homosexuals ...but is rather a modest attempt by seemingly tolerant
Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful
minority to revise those mores through use of the laws." Id. at 636. He also stated that
Amendment 2 "sought to counter.., the geographic concentration and the disproportionate
political power of homosexuals." Id.at 647.
223. See M. V. LEE BADGET, INCOME INFLATION: THE MYTH OF AFFLUENCE AMONG GAY,
LESBIAN, AND BisExuAL AMERICANS (1998) (rebutting the idea that gay, lesbian, and bisexual
Americans can earn more income via statistical analysis and comparison).
224. Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
225. See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 574 (9th
Cir. 1990) (stating that "homosexuals are not without political power; they have the ability to
and do 'attract the attention of the lawmakers,' as evidenced by such legislation") (quoting
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,445 (1985)).
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and non-procreative obsession with copies ironically generates financial copia.
In addition, and more interesting still, the myth of gay affluence has been
deployed in such a way so as to deprive sexual minorities of the benefit of
heightened judicial scrutiny and therefore of certain legal rights. Because
barren and childless sexual minorities are presumed to possess more resources
and political power than other citizens, they ostensibly need less by way of
legal protection. The myth therefore places them in the same double bind in
which Narcissus, a symbolic counterfeiter, finds himself-possessing a surplus
of resources that renders them legally powerless.
Significantly, the myth of gay affluence/gay narcissism has found its way
into the more recent same-sex marriage cases as well as the critical commentary
surrounding the same-sex marriage debate. While the language of narcissism
that the myth inspires is not always explicit in the cases and commentary, it
nevertheless surfaces in the following three ways.
First, states sometimes advert to the allegedly superior economic position
of same-sex couples relative to cross-sex couples in support of their same-sex
marriage prohibitions. For instance, in Goodridge, the Commonwealth
attempted (unsuccessfully) to justify its same-sex marriage prohibition by
relying, in part, on a rationale that highlighted gays and lesbians' ostensible
economic surplus-a surplus which, in the Commonwealth's view, entitled
them to less protection.22 6 As the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
noted, "[t]he marriage restriction is rational, [the Commonwealth] argues,
because the General Court logically could assume that same-sex couples are
more financially independent
than married couples and thus less needy of
227
benefits.
marital
public
Second, the private welfare version of the procreation rationale assumes
that same-sex couples possess an abundance of resources, financial and
otherwise, which allow them to engage in responsible procreation. For
instance, the Morrison court observed that same-sex couples may become
parents through "artificial reproduction methods [which are] frequently costly
and time-consuming. 2 28 In a footnote, the court remarked that two women
may reproduce by relying on in vitro fertilization (IVF), one cycle of which
"has been estimated at $12,400. ' '229 Alternatively, a same-sex couple may
226. Goodridge v. Dep't. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941,964 (Mass. 2003) (summarizing
and dismissing the Commonwealth's argument that same-sex couples are less financially
dependent on each other than opposite-sex couples).
227. Id.(emphasis added).
228. Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 24 (Ind.App. 2005) (comparing various methods
of becoming parents as same-sex versus cross-sex couples).
229. Id.atn.10.
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choose to adopt, which costs "as much as $40,000 or more., 230 In other words,
Morrisonrecognized that artificial procreation is not only more responsible but
more costly as well. Its analysis of that rationale rests on the assumption that
same-sex couples who are reproducing already possess the financial resources
to invest in child-bearing; for this reason, they do not need marital rights. Once
again, gays and lesbians are placed in a situation where their non-procreative,
counterfeit sex guarantees them riches (or copia) which, in turn, render them
bereft of legal protection.
Third and last, critics of same-sex marriage have at times adverted to the
myth of gay affluence/gay narcissism in order to defend a contrary position,
namely, that same-sex couples should not be awarded marital rights because
they are not investing their resources in having and raising children. Whereas
the Morrison court at least suggests that same-sex couples are overinvesting in
child-bearing by spending upwards of $12,400 for one IVF cycle (noting also
that "it frequently takes multiple cycles in order to succeed" 231) or "as much as
$40,000 or more, 232 to adopt, some opponents of same-sex marriage have
argued that same-sex couples underinvest because they allegedly do not bear
the costs of having and raising children. Under this view, same-sex couples are
hoarding their resources in a narcissistic and self-centered way.
Professor Douglas Kmiec is one such proponent of the latter view. In
support of the procreation rationale for same-sex marriage prohibitions, Kmiec
has recently likened all advocates of same-sex marriage to the legendarily
narcissistic Manichees, a third-century religious sect that:
[S]ubscribed to the notion that human beings were sparks of light or energy
that were imprisoned by the created world order. Good in a Manichean
society took the form of defying created human nature, including
procreative intercourse. The Manichees in essence taught that it was
salutary to hate one's body. The Manichees not surprisingly did not have a
large impact upon the social order of their time, or any other, but their selfcenteredness was certainly part of the Roman order, which indulged
including prostitution, homosexual relations,
numerous sexual practices,
33
and masturbation.2

230.

Id.

231. Id.
232. Id.
233. See Douglas W. Kmiec, The Procreative Argument for Proscribing Same-Sex
Marriage,32 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 653, 664 (2005) (discussing the possible rationales for
limiting same-sex marriage).
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Furthermore, Kmiec has argued that it would be unfair to extend marital rights
to these "self-centered" and "Manichean" same-sex couples because, in his
view, they do not bear the financial responsibility of raising children:
[T]oday, traditional parents make an investment of over $200,000
(exclusive of college) to bring up a child to age 18, and yet, they often
receive the same economic benefits as those who do not invest in raising
children. Adding an increased number of childless [married] homosexual
partners to the mix makes matters worse.234
Similarly, Professor George Dent has remarked that "[b]ecause gay couples do
not bear children ...many gay marriages would be marriages of convenience
entered into primarilyfor the tangible benefits., 235 It is partly on account of
this purported utilitarian approach to same-sex marriage that Dent has labeled
that relationship one "of convenience," and argues that most Americans
consider same-sex marriage a "burlesque," a "mere parody," and a "caricature
of the real thing., 236 Where Morrisontherefore sees surfeit (or overinvestment
in children), Kmiec and Dent see lack (or underinvestment in children).
Nevertheless, under both views, same-sex couples have too much to spend in
large part because they engage in a kind of sex whose non-procreative attributes
allow for the disproportionate accumulation of wealth, the "high disposable
income" to which Justice Scalia alluded in his Romer dissent.
When viewed through the lens of the counterfeiting trope and its history,
the procreation rationale for same-sex marriage prohibitions is in some very real
sense repeating the history of sodomy regulation. While the rhetorical
strategies have shifted from disgust to counterfeit--or what Didi Herman has
termed a shift from a rhetoric of purity to a rhetoric of pragmatism 2 3 7 -the
underlying assumptions are the same. In the current same-sex marriage debate,
sexual minorities do not need the protections of the law because they engage in
non-procreative (and narcissistic) conduct that confers upon them monetary
privilege and power, the very same reasoning that largely fueled Justice Scalia's
234. See id.
at 658 (arguing that an economic advantage exists for same-sex couples that
should support limiting same-sex marriage).
235. See George W. Dent, Jr., TraditionalMarriage: Still Worth Defending, 18 BYU J.
PUB. L. 424, 424 (2004) (emphasis added) (discussing possible motivators for same-sex couples

to marry).
236. See id. at 425 (quotations and citations omitted) (discussing Americans' general
feelings toward same-sex marriage).
237. See Didi Herman, (Il)legitimateMinorities: The American ChristianRight's AntiGay-Rights Discourse, 23 J. LAW & Soc. 346, 353 (1996) (criticizing the Christian Right's
attack on gays' minority status). For Herman's book-length treatment on this rhetorical
trajectory, see DIDI HERMAN,THE ANTI-GAY AGENDA, ORTHODOX VISION AND THE CHRISTIAN
RIGHT (1997).

THE GENUINE ARTICLE
238
Romer dissent and traces of which appear in his Lawrence v. Texas dissent.
Given the history behind the counterfeiting trope and its integral association
with non-procreative sex, it is no surprise that an image of the counterfeiter
surfaces in these two dissenting opinions which deal either implicitly or quite
explicitly with same-sex conduct.
The early-modem image that perhaps best captures the extent to which
history is repeating itself is that of the usurer ingesting feces. While not a
counterfeiter, the usurer-he who lends money at interest-was nevertheless
someone who, for the early-modem mind, committed an economic crime (and
sin) that connected him to the sodomites and brought him within sodomy's
ambit. The early-modem association between usury and sodomy followed from
Aristotle, for whom usury was "the birth of money from money" and "of all
modes of making money... the most unnatural." 239 Strange bedfellows, the
usurers and the sodomites had one thing in common: They both generated
excess through unnatural means. Where the sodomite produced and exchanged
semen in a non-reproductive way, the usurer produced and exchanged money in
a legendarily unnatural way-as his riches increased purely by dint of interest
rather than by dint of investment.24 ° In a sense, the usurer was the inverse of
the sodomite: Where the former turned an otherwise sterile product (money)
into something fruitful, the latter turned an otherwise fruitful product (semen)
into something sterile. Nevertheless, and not coincidentally, Dante places the
usurers and the sodomites together in the same level of hell above the
counterfeiters, where they are punished for violating "Nature" and "God's art,"
respectively, and where they both reside on a burning plain, an image of the
241
sterility that marks their unnatural economic and sexual activity.
Medieval historian, Jacques Le Goff, describes the image of the usurer
that appears in the fresco of Hell in the Collegiate Church of San Gimignano,
Italy, as someone who is orally ingesting the devil's excrement-excrement
243
which turns out to be gold coins242 -and who is placed alongside a sodomite.

dissenting) (stating that
238. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
"[t]oday's opinion is the product of a Court, which is the product of a law-profession culture,
that has largely signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda, by which I mean the agenda
promoted by some homosexual activists directed at eliminating the moral opprobrium that has
traditionally attached to homosexual conduct").
239. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 71-72 (B. Jowett ed. & trans., 1996) (discussing various
means of becoming wealthy).
240. Fisher, supra note 133, at 14.
241. DANTE, supranote 155, at 25.
242. JACQUES LE GOFF, YOUR MONEY OR YOUR LIFE: ECONOMY AND RELIGION IN THE
MIDDLE AGES 50 (Patricia Ranum trans., 1990).
243. Id. at 50-51 (noting that Dante consequently placed the usurers in Hell withthe
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The image of the usurer with a mouth laden with the devil's excrement recalls
the image of the feces-eating homosexual that surfaced in the rhetorical
campaign surrounding the passage of Colorado's Amendment 2244 -an image
that at least implicitly appears in Justice Scalia's Romer dissent, which at once
highlights homosexual conduct and homosexual power. It also conveys the
disgust that we might feel when in the company of a swindler, thus explaining
the modem slang that we use to describe someone who is, in Professor William
Ian Miller's words, "faking it.",24 5 More than this, the image of the commercial
fraudster placed next to a sodomite perfectly captures the Janus-faced discourse
that has marked the construction of sexual minorities in the law over the last ten
years: A class whose non-procreative activity renders it at once a source of
disgust and a paradigm of fraud-or, perhaps more accurately, a class whose
non-procreative fraud inspires disgust.
In this sense, both the procreation rationale, and the current casting of gay
and lesbian couples in the same-sex marriage debate as avaricious
counterfeiters, suggest that what is repugnant about sodomy is not the act itself;
surely, as Bowers and Lawrence remind us, cross-sex couples do the same.
Rather, what is repugnant is the fraud that such non-procreative activity
represents, something which the Santos and D. v. C.courts also recognized. By
calling it fraud and by talking about it in terms reminiscent of fraud, however,
same-sex marriage opponents and some jurists would appear to be on sound
constitutional ground. That is, while what Lawrence really "holds" (and how it
gets there) has been the subject of much critical debate, the majority opinion
makes one thing fairly certain: Morality, as the embodiment of our collective
disgust, is no longer even a legitimate basis for laws that regulate what certain
individuals do behind closed door in the confines of their home. Casting samesex relationships and same-sex procreation as a kind of fraud, then, attempts to
transform disgust over private acts into something that is legally defensible
after that landmark case. The claim here would be: Same-sex marriage
prohibitions do not flow from disgust but rather from a concern over public
fraud.

sodomites).
244. See Martha Nussbaum, "Secret Sewers of Vice": Disgust, Bodies, and the Law, in
THE PASSIONS OF LAW 27-28 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999) (documenting that campaign).
245. See generally WILLIAM IAN MILLER, FAKING IT (2005) (describing the "daily
hypocrisies" of the average person). This also explains, at least in part, why Leon Kass has
characterized the duplicative-and duplicitous-reproductive practice of cloning as
"repugnant." See generally Leon R. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance: Why We Should Ban
the Cloningof Humans, 32 VAL. U. L. REv. 679 (1998) (criticizing the cloning of humans and
advocating a bar on the practice).
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The history behind the sodomy-counterfeiting analogy and its resurfacing
in the same-sex marriage debate, however, suggest that certain conduct is
disgusting precisely because it is fraudulent. While perhaps more palatable
than the claim that what these people do disgusts me and for that reason should
be legally prohibited, the procreation rationale is merely a kinder, gentler way
of expressing why certain acts disgust us in the first instance. Once again, we
should not forget that in Dante's infernal underworld, counterfeiters are worse
than the sodomites-even as the two represent two sides of the same proverbial
coin. Nor should we forget that Dante places a truly iconic figure of incest,
Ovid's Myrrha, among the counterfeiters because she falsified herself in order
to have sex with her father-thus suggesting that incest is an archetypal form of
disgust because it is the archetypal form of fraudulent desire.
B. MarriageMiscegenation
The historical analogy between miscegenation and counterfeiting helps to
explain the more recent, private welfare version of the procreation rationale,
one that has stumped commentators, and some judges, because it ironically
places same-sex couples in a superior position relative to their cross-sex
counterparts. Indeed, how might we explain the tortured logic that assumes
that same-sex couples do not need the protections of the law because they are
better than straight couples when it comes to having children? The Narcissus
myth and the double bind that it projects already supplies us with one answer,
namely, same-sex couples do not need the protections of the law because they
already have monetary power and the privileges that flow from it. The
miscegenation analogy, however, supplies us with a better answer, namely, the
superior form of procreation in which same-sex couples engage is allowing
them to look too much like the cross-sex family paradigm. As such, the
procreation rationale increasingly functions to prevent fraudulent same-sex
marriage passing.
Part II argued that the more recent version of the procreation rationale
reflects an implicit fear of the reality of same-sex procreation. While some
courts have continued to emphasize the extent to which same-sex reproduction
is different from the cross-sex model, 246 most courts that have upheld same-sex
marriage prohibitions on the basis of procreation are increasingly recognizing
that same-sex couples are reproducing and having families through asexual
246. See, e.g., Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15,28 (Ind. App. 2005) (noting the "highly
significant difference" in the way in which cross-sex couples and same-sex couples become
parents).

454
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means. In Hernandez, for example, the lower court stated that "the reality is
that significant numbers of couples in New York have formed same-sex
families, and numerous couples will continue to do so, whether they are
allowed to marry or not., 247 Even those courts that have upheld same-sex
marriage prohibitions on the basis of encouraging responsible procreation have
recognized the reality of same-sex families. In Standhardt, for instance, the
court recognized that "some same-sex couples also raise children," even as it
concluded that the "exclusion of these couples from the marriage relationship
does not defeat the reasonableness of the link between opposite-sex marriage,
procreation, and child-rearing., 248 Similarly, in Lewis, in which the New Jersey
Superior Court upheld that state's same-sex marriage prohibition partly on the
basis of procreation, Judge Collester, in dissent, stated bluntly that "[t]he fact is
some persons in committed same-sex relationships can and do legally and
functionally procreate... [The plaintiffs] in this case.., each gave birth to
their children following artificial insemination." 249 The very thing that rendered
same- and cross-sex partners intrinsically different and that justified differential
treatment of those two classes from a constitutional perspective in the early
same-sex marriage cases-the ability to procreate-is the same thing that is
starting to bridge the gap between them.
A burgeoning anxiety that same-sex families are beginning to look too
much like, and are therefore passing as, the cross-sex family paradigm has
accompanied the courts' (and the public's) increased awareness of the reality of
same-sex procreation. Such a fear is reflected in contemporary counterfeiting
rhetoric and the emphasis that it often places on deceptive imitation: Robert
Knight remarks that "if [same-sex partnerships are] called marriage, it's a
counterfeit version. And counterfeit versions drive out the real thing., 250 Such
a fear is also reflected in the private welfare procreation rationale for same-sex
marriage prohibitions. Because the private welfare procreation rationale
captures the reality that same-sex couples are reproducing, it raises the
possibility that they are, or at least might be, passing for real families.
The private welfare procreation rationale sometimes casts same-sex
procreation as a better version or product than its cross-sex counterpart. For
instance, while the Morrison court remarked in a footnote that the principal
methods of same-sex child-bearing, artificial reproduction and adoption,
247. Hemandez v. Robles, 794 N.Y.S.2d 579, 599 (N.Y. Sup. 2005), rev 'd and vacatedby
805 N.Y.S.2d 354 (2005), affd 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006).
248. Standhardt v. Superior Ct. of Ariz., 77 P.3d 451, 462 (Ariz. App. Div. 2003).
249. Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 285 (N.J. 2005) (Collester, J., dissenting), aff'd as
modifiedby 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006).
250. Dunlap, supra note 5, at A18.
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involve significant costs, it also implied that the couples who avail themselves
of such methods might be better parents because of their substantial investment
ex ante:
Those persons who have invested the significant time, effort, and expense
associated with assisted reproduction or adoption may be seen as very
likely to be able to provide [a stable environment for children], with or

without the "protections" of marriage, because of the high level of financial
and emotional commitment exerted in conceiving or adopting a child or
children in the first place.251

Once again, same-sex couples need less (legal protection) because they
have invested more (financial and emotional resources). What is most
interesting here from the perspective of the counterfeiting analogy to same-sex
relations, however, is the suggestion that the artificial reproductive imitation (or
counterfeit) has not diluted or devalued the real thing but rather surpassed it.
When viewed in this light, the counterfeit is not a counterfeit at all but rather a
completely new (and better) product. The Morrisoncourt's explicit casting of
same-sex reproduction as an artificial imitation that is better than the natural
paradigm-an image of procreation that has appeared in other cases that have
upheld same-sex marriage prohibitions on the basis of this rationale 252-thus
ironically conflicts with the image of same-sex reproduction that emerges from
counterfeiting rhetoric more generally: An unworthy replica of the real thing.
Moreover, this image of a superior procreative product (and process) suggests
that same-sex couples would be getting an unfair advantage were the state to
extend them marital rights because presumably they already have the monetary
resources to invest in responsible procreation.
At the same time, however, the private welfare rationale also works in
concert with the notion that same-sex marriage not only is a degraded form of
the real thing but also devalues the real thing. For instance, in Lewis, the New
Jersey Superior Court upheld the state's same-sex marriage prohibition by
adverting, in part, to the rational basis of encouraging responsible
procreation. 3 In so doing, a concurring opinion remarked that the most "vital"
purpose of marriage is "to control or ameliorate [procreation's] consequencesthe so-called 'private welfare' purpose., 254 The opinion went on to suggest that
251. Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 24 (Ind. App. 2005).
252. See supranote 60 and accompanying text (discussing other cases that have relied on
this same rationale).
253. It bears noting that the Attorney General of New Jersey "disclaim[ed] the promotion
of procreation as a rationale for prohibiting same-sex marriage." Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259,
284 (N.J. App. 2005) (Collester, J., dissenting).
254. Id. at 276 (Parrillo, J.A.D., concurring).
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it is this procreative function of cross-sex marriage that renders that relationship
"meaningful" and that confers upon it a "specialness" that same-sex marriage
(and the artificial reproduction that may occur within that context) lacks.255
Under this view, cross-sex marriage derives its uniqueness by virtue of the kind
of procreation that it both guarantees and protects. Procreation is no longer
about propagation of the species, as it was during the early phase of marriage
litigation in the 1970s and 1980s, but rather about preserving the uniqueness of
the relationship in which it ideally occurs.
Moreover, and as the opinion further notes, to recognize relationships
where procreation does not occur between two unrelated, cross-sex individuals
would be to dilute the distinctiveness of the original marital model. Perhaps
speculating on the substance of those "other reasons ...to promote the
institution of marriage, 256 to which Justice O'Connor alluded in her Lawrence
concurrence, 25 7 the Lewis concurrence stated that "there are reasons for limiting
unfettered access to marriage. Otherwise, by allowing the multiplicity of
human choices that bear no resemblance to marriage to qualify, the institution
would become non-recognizable and unable to perform its vital function [of
controlling or ameliorating the consequences of cross-sex procreation]."258 By
preserving the unique and special connection that exists among marriage, crosssex intercourse, and procreation, the private welfare rationale thus ensures that
a marriage copy-a state-sanctioned relationship, for example, where
procreation between two people does not occur through sexual means-does
not render the original on which it is based "non-recognizable., 259 Instead of
ensuring the continuation of society, procreation is now being deployed to
ensure the continuation of marriage. Sexual procreation no longer figures as a
necessary condition of marriage. Rather, marriage is a necessary condition of
sexual procreation-and only sexual procreation.
The emphasis placed here on the uniqueness of cross-sex procreation,
within the marital context, invites us to consider same-sex procreation as an
artificial counterfeit of the former that devalues-and dilutes-it in the process
of imitating it. The language that the concurring opinion uses to describe what
would happen were the state to recognize a form of marriage that does not
promote the vital purpose of encouraging responsible procreation reflects a
situation analogous to the introduction of counterfeit currency into the market.
255. Id. at 277 (Parrillo, J.A.D., concurring).
256. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that "other reasons exist to promote the
257. See id.
institution of marriage beyond mere moral disapproval of an excluded group").
258. Lewis, 875 A.2d at 277 (Parillo, J.A.D., concurring).
259. Id. (Parillo, J.A.D., concurring).
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Specifically, the recognition of same-sex marriage would cause the uniqueness
of the institution of marriage to fade-"to become non-recognizable and unable
to perform its vital function" 260 -in a way that recalls the power of a counterfeit
to compromise the distinctiveness and efficacy of the real thing. The Lewis
concurrence, together with the materials surveyed in the previous Part,
therefore suggest that same-sex relationships operate as counterfeit in three
different, albeit interrelated senses: (1) those who partake of such a
relationship presumptively engage in counterfeit sex that constitutes a crude
imitation of real-that is, procreative-sex; (2) those who partake of such a
relationship sometimes "cause procreation, 261 through an artificial-that is, a
counterfeit-process; and (3) that counterfeit process enables same-sex couples
to create a counterfeit product-that is, the "same-sex family"-that can, in
turn, pass for the real thing.
If we push the counterfeiting analogy a bit further, however, the
' 262
concurring opinion's fear that artificial substitutes that "bear no resemblance
to marriage will render marriage less distinctive makes no more sense than does
the counterfeiting analogy to civil unions and same-sex marriage. As Part II.B
queried, if civil unions are not called marriage, and if same-sex marriage is
legally the same as cross-sex marriage, then how do civil unions and same-sex
marriage operate as counterfeit? So, too, here: If same-sex marriage truly bears
no resemblance to cross-sex marriage, then how could it possibly render that
archetypal institution non-recognizable? Put another way, how does an
imitation pass for-and, in the process, dilute-an original if it is not really an
imitation at all?
The historical linking of counterfeiting and miscegenation surveyed in Part
IV offers a way to understand just what is going on in the Lewis concurrence
and what is really behind the procreative fear that it projects. Nineteenthcentury counterfeiting rhetoric captured, in part, what was so threatening about
the consequences of miscegenation-namely, the creation of an individual (like
Homer Plessy) who, in the eyes of essentialists, did not bear any resemblance to
a white man but who was nevertheless passing as one. In the process, the value
of whiteness became non-recognizable and unable to perform its vital function
of maintaining racial hierarchy. The irony, of course, is that Homer Plessy did
resemble the white man whom he was, in the eyes of essentialists, trying to
imitate (or pass for) because Homer Plessy was, in fact, multi-racial. The point
260. Id. (Parillo, J.A.D., concurring).
261. Marriage Cases, 2005 WL 583129, at *12 n.3 (Mar. 14, 2005).
262. Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 284 (N.J. App. 2005) (Collester, J., dissenting), aff'd
as modified by 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006).
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here is that traditional marriage in the Lewis concurrence, and in the eyes of
marriage traditionalists more generally, assumes the same position that
whiteness did for nineteenth-century essentialists. Like ethnic miscegenation,
marriage miscegenation produces copies that pass for the real thing, and, in the
process, render the real thing less distinctive. In recognizing the reality of
same-sex procreation and the danger that it poses, then, the private welfare
rationale acts as barrier to prevent marriage-mixing. It is for precisely this
reason that the Lewis concurrence also remarks that the state must "draw[]
principled boundaries 2 63 around the traditional institution of marriage in order
to preserve its unique, procreative function.
This Part concludes here by briefly offering two additional reasons for
why the miscegenation analogy to same-sex marriage makes sense on a more
substantive level, each of which returns to the counterfeiting analogy. First,
marriage traditionalists have deployed counterfeiting rhetoric in the same-sex
marriage debate in a way that is uniquely tied to an anxiety over subversive and
deceptive reproduction. As Part III set forth at length, opponents of same-sex
marriage label same-sex couples a counterfeit in large part because they
presumptively engage in non-procreative sex (i.e., a counterfeit process) that
mimics the real thing and because they produce families (i.e. a counterfeit
product) that attempt to pass for the real thing. It is surely no coincidence that
opponents of reproductive cloning, a practice that is routinely characterized as
deceptive and fraudulent-and as with same-sex relationships, repugnant
because it is deceptive and fraudulent 64-associate that technology specifically
with same-sex couples. 265 Cloning represents just those aspects of same-sex
procreation that are most threatening-a narcissistic obsession with the same
and a deceptive reproduction of the same-writ large. Similar reproductive
concerns, of course, inspired lawmakers to criminalize miscegenation. In
Loving, the state of Virginia argued, and the appeals court agreed, that its
criminal anti-miscegenation statute was necessary in order to prevent a
"mongrel breed of citizens. 2 66 In State v. Jackson, the Supreme Court of
Missouri went so far as to claim that miscegenation, like sodomy, defeated
263. Id.
264. See Kass, supranote 245, at 687 (stating that repugnance of human cloning is caused
by the understanding that it is a "violation of things we rightfully hold dear").
265. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & EDWARD STEIN, Queer Clones, in CLONES AND
CLONES: FACTS AND FANTASIES ABOUT HUMAN CLONING 95 (Martha C. Nussbaum & Cass R.
Sunstein eds., 1998) (discussing queer cloning and concluding that while it may trigger anti-gay
or anticloning measures, it may also expand gays' and lesbians' options when forming families).
266. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 5 (1967) (quoting Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E. 2d 749,756
(1955)).
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procreation. As the court stated: "It is stated as a well authenticated fact that if
the issue of a black man and a white woman, and a white man and a black
woman, intermarry, they cannot possibly have any progeny., 26 7 Although
miscegenation historically represented the mixing of two entities that were not too
alike but rather too different, it nevertheless equally signified an illegitimate (and
therefore counterfeit) form of reproduction. For instance, a colonial law that
prevented intermarriage between blacks and whites in Massachusetts, entitled
"An Act for the Better Preventing of a Spurious and Mixed Issue,"268 highlighted
just this deceptiveness of mixed-race reproduction. Like today, in 1705
"spurious" denoted "a sham or a counterfeit" as well as non-marital progeny.269
Second, the nineteenth-century anxiety that surrounded counterfeit (or
greenback) currency, racial equality, and the artificial legislation that would
ostensibly guarantee both finds its counterpart in the recent anxiety over same-sex
marriage. Not only is same-sex marriage, like mixed-race persons and newlyfreed slaves, conceptualized in terms of counterfeit, but the rhetoric that surrounds
same-sex marriage highlights the fact that the law simply cannot change what is
the naturally given marital paradigm. Marriage traditionalists routinely appeal to
natural law arguments in order to justify both what the current legal regime is and
what it should be. 270 Moreover, like the nineteenth-century essentialists, they also
suggest that a positive law that recognizes same-sex marriage is (or would be)
fraudulent because it contravenes natural law. It is for precisely this reason that
Professor Wardle has suggested that "a state that confers the legal status of
marriage upon same-sex unions commits fraud when it presents a false image of
same-sex unions as comparable to traditional marriage."2 71 The Concerned
Women for America expressed a similar concern when it remarked that the
original Federal Marriage Amendment as drafted "would result in legalized
267.
268.

State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175, 179 (1883).
See An Act for the Better Preventing of a Spurious and Mixed Issue, reprintedin THE

CHARTERS AND GENERAL LAWS OF THE COLONY AND PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY, 779,

748 (T. B. Wait and Co. 1814) (1705) ("None of her majesty's English or Scottish subjects, nor
of any other Christian nation within this province, shall contract matrimony with any negro or
mulatto; nor shall any person duly authorized to solemnize marriages, presume to join any such
in marriage.").
269. XVI OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 148, at 376 (entry for spurious, a.).
270. See, e.g., Gerard V. Bradley, Law and the Cultureof Marriage, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 189, 194 (2004) ("Marriage is a pre-political moral and cultural institution
upon which the law supervenes, the law recognizes marriage, regulates it, promotes it, protects
it. But it does not encourage it."); Robert P. George & Gerard V. Bradley, Marriageand the
LiberalImagination, 84 GEO. L.J. 301, 305 (1995) (rejecting "the proposition that sex can be
legitimately instrumentalized, that is,
treated as a mere means to any extrinsic end, including
procreation").
271. Wardle, supra note 86, at 775 (emphasis added).
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counterfeit marriage"'27 2-relying on the oxymoronic phrase, "legalized
counterfeit," to underscore the state's role in perpetrating a fraud upon the
public. 273 Indeed, under this view, a legal regime that both condoned and
same-sex passing would be no less fraudulent than a counterfeiter
encouraged
274
herself.

VI. Normative Implications and Queeringthe Double Bind
This Article has shown that the counterfeiting trope is descriptively
inaccurate as applied to same-sex relationships: Same-sex marriage is, quite
simply, not a counterfeit. At the same time, however, this Article has also shown
that the counterfeiting trope makes sense in light of its history: Same-sex
marriage is, in fact, a counterfeit for the same reasons that both sodomy and
miscegenation once were (and, in the case of sodomy, continues to be). Having
surveyed the history behind counterfeiting rhetoric and used that history to
explain the procreation rationale, this Part now turns to a more normative critique
of counterfeiting rhetoric and to the future. The objective of this Part is twofold.
Section A demonstrates that counterfeiting rhetoric, like the law more generally,
continues to place sexual minorities in a double bind in precisely that area of the
law, domestic relations, where the double bind has operated to deny that group a
panoply of rights. Section B, which is more prospective in purpose and scope,
proposes what a "queer" reading of the queer as counterfeit analogy might look
like.
A. Counterfeit,Imitation, and the Double Bind
The counterfeiting analogy to same-sex relationships warrants criticism for
three reasons. First, and most obvious, same-sex relationships are not deceptive
272. LaRue, supra note 93 (emphasis added).
273. Professor Kmiec has characterized San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom's decision to
hand out "counterfeit" marriage licenses to same-sex couples in violation of California law in
2004 as an instance where the "bald-faced claims of counterfeit equality overlook[ed] the
irreplaceability of the civilizing agency of the traditional family altogether." Maria Kennedy,
San Francisco's Gay Revolution, SAN FRAN. FArm, Apr. 2004, http://www.sffaith.com/
ed/articles/2004/0404mk.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2007) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
274. It is worth noting that in 1980, a court that looked favorably upon same-sex marriage
prohibitions felt otherwise when it suggested that only "an affirmative enactment of Congress"
could lead to a situation where same-sex relationships are "characterized as 'marriages."'
Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1125 (1980).
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on their face. Second, that analogy continues to place gays and lesbians in a
vicious double bind. Third, and relatedly, that analogy perpetuates the
discourse or rhetoric of fraud that has surrounded the legal construction of
sexual minorities for centuries. Remarkably, even some radical feminist critics
who believe that marriage is not a "path to liberation" for sexual minorities 275
have characterized same-sex marriage as a kind of imitation-albeit the
imitation not of a superior product, but of an intrinsically flawed institution that
perpetuates gender discrimination and inequality. Professor Nancy Polikoff, for
instance, has remarked that "I believe that the desire to marry in the lesbian and
gay community is an attempt to mimic the worst of mainstream society, an
effort to fit into an inherently problematic institution that betrays the promise of
both lesbian and gay liberation and radical feminism., 276 Polikoff is not alone
among feminist and queer theorists in advocating that the queer community
shift its focus from the "unacceptably conservative" prospect of marriage to
more progressive social concerns, such as universal healthcare "regardless of
marital status. 2 77 Nevertheless, Polikoff's characterization of gays and
lesbians' desire to marry as a kind of mimicry in and of itself is noteworthy
because it suggests that even those who would likely take issue with the
conservative casting of same-sex marriage as counterfeit are thinking about
same-sex marriage in terms of deceptive impersonation.
The language of mimicry and counterfeiting which has pervaded the samesex marriage debate--on both sides-perpetuates the double bind in which the
law routinely places sexual minorities. Indeed, counterfeiting rhetoric, along
with the procreation rationale, places queers in a number of double binds. For
instance, by depicting selfish sexual minorities as at once having an
overabundance of economic capital (tangible resources) and a dearth of
procreative capital (true riches in the form of children), counterfeiting rhetoric
places them in the impossible position of having too much, and yet not enough.
275. Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When is Marriagea Path to Liberation?,in LESBIAN AND
GAY MARRIAGE 20, 20 (Suzanne Sherman ed., 1992).
276. Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay andLesbian
Marriage Will Not "Dismantlethe Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage,"79 VA. L.
REv. 1535, 1536 (1993) (emphasis added).
277. Judith Butler, Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual?,in UNDOING GENDER 109
(2002) ("For a progressive sexual movement, even one that may want to produce marriage as an
option for nonheterosexuals, the proposition that marriage should become the only way to
sanction or legitimate sexuality is unacceptably conservative."). But see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE,
JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 5-

6 (1996) ("For some, gay marriage is unnatural or abominable. For others, it is an assimilative
sellout. For me-and I hope for you after you read this book-same-sex marriage is natural and
just.").
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Similarly, by at once emphasizing that same-sex couples cannot have children
through sexual means and that they can bear children in a more responsible
manner, the procreation rationale for same-sex marriage prohibitions places
sexual minorities in the hopeless position of being both inferior and superior to
their cross-sex counterparts in terms of procreative ability. In this sense, the
evolution of the procreation rationale itself perpetuates the double bind that
counterfeiting rhetoric reflects.
The idea, though, that sexual minorities are deceptive because they are
attempting to mimic (and pass for) married, cross-sex couples and their families
helps to perpetuate yet another double bind, one that has functioned most
vigorously in the family law context. The law routinely requires gay and
lesbian parents to cover their sexual identity--or, more drastically, to pass as
straight-should they desire to retain even limited custodial or visitation rights
over their children. While a homosexual sexual orientation operates as a per se
bar on custody and/or visitation in only a minority ofjurisdictions, 278 same-sex
conduct that occurs in the presence of children-including, but not limited to,
displays of affection between same-sex partners--continues to operate as a
significant factor in custodial and visitation decisions in a majority of
jurisdictions. 279 As Yoshino has observed, most courts not only regularly
penalize gay and lesbian parents for failing to cover, but some courts have even
"articulated a standard that suggests that the [gay or lesbian] parent must
convert., 280 In the custodial and visitation context, then, gay and lesbian
parents are effectively required to self-counterfeit-that is, required to assume
the very traits or qualities of mimicry and counterfeit that same-sex marriage
opponents appear to despise most.
Moreover, in some jurisdictions, same-sex partners who are parents (or
single gays and lesbians) are ineligible to adopt because they cannot pass for
cross-sex parents. For instance, in In re Adoption of Charles B., the Court of
Appeals of Ohio found that sexual minorities were barred from adopting under
that state's adoption law even though sexual orientation did not operate as an
explicit statutory bar to adoption.2 81 In refusing "[t]o impute to the

278. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 858-59 n.497 (listing Florida as the only state with a
statutory per se bar and citing cases in other jurisdictions, including Kentucky, Missouri, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, and Virginia, where courts have found that "homosexuality alone is aperse
reason for denying custody or visitation rights").
279. See id. at 859 (suggesting that courts are more likely to grant custodial rights to those
gay or lesbian parents that cover or mask their activity from their children).
280. Id. at 862.
281. In re Adoption of Charles B., 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 4435 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988).
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legislature ...an intention to make homosexuals eligible to adopt,"2 82 the court
invoked the very language of passing to express its belief that gay parents could
not "imitate" and "pass for" cross-sex families because "homosexuals" could
not sexually procreate:
Homosexuality negates procreation. Announced homosexuality defeats the
goals of adoption. It will be impossiblefor the child to pass as the natural
child of the adoptive 'family" or to adapt to the community by quietly
blending in free from controversy and stigma. A principle inherent in
adoption since Roman days is "adoptio naturam imitatur," adoption imitates
nature. The fundamental rationale for adoption is to provide a child with
the closest approximation to a birth family that is available.283
More recently, in Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children and
Family Services, the Eleventh Circuit upheld Florida's law that prohibited
sexual minorities from adopting partly on the rational basis that adoptive
284
households should "resemble the nuclear family as closely as possible.
The criticism that sexual minorities are unable to pass (or cover) that
emerges from these cases conflicts with the more general criticism that sexual
minorities are deceptive because they do often pass (or cover). For instance, in
Weigandv. Houghton, the Supreme Court of Mississippi upheld a lower court's
decision refusing a gay father's petition for custody partly on the basis that the
father did not engage in "open sign[s] of affection" with his partner in front of
his child; rather, the father "merely retreat[ed] behind closed and locked door,
hiding and secreting his own sexuality from Paul." 285 While Yoshino reads the
Wiegand court's statement as a covering demand that is "tantamount to a
demand for conversion,, 286 it may also be read as a criticism that rests on the
father's deceptiveness and that at least implies that he is being dishonest by
hiding and secreting his authentic self and instead impersonating someone else
in front of his son. Of course, if the father did not engage in this kind of selfcounterfeiting, the court would likely have found that he was not covering
enough. Suffice it to say here, though, that as with the deployment of
counterfeiting rhetoric by marriage traditionalists, the judicial treatment of gay
and lesbian parents in the custodial context perpetuates a double bind that casts
282. Id. at 5.
283. Id. at 6 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
284. Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children & Family Serv., 358 F.3d 804,818 (11 th Cir.
2004). For the conceptualization of the adoptive family as an artificial family that ideally
mirrors the natural family, see Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutesfor the Real Thing?, 52 DUKE
L.J. 1077, 1144 (2003).
285. Weigand v. Houghton, 730 So. 2d 581, 586 (Miss. 1999).
286. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 863.
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sexual minorities as both fraudulent (attempting to pass) and not fraudulent
enough (refusing or being unable to pass).
B. Queeringthe Double Bind
Is it possible to recast the counterfeiting analogy to same-sex
relationships-and the freight of negative connotations that the very term,
counterfeit, bears-in a positive way and put it to constructive use? In the
words of George Lakoff, cognitive linguist and founder of the Rockridge
Institute, is it possible to "reframe" the marriage debate in a way that highlights
the salutaryaspects of imitation? Or, are sexual minorities forever doomed to
being conceptualized as deceptive, derivative, and deceptively derivative?
By co-opting the very stereotype of "queer as counterfeit" and turning it
back on itself as a form of political opposition, the protestors who launched the
Queer Dollars Campaign in Cleveland attempted to do precisely that-that is,
attempted to use the rhetoric of deceptive imitation to their own advantage.
Specifically, the Campaign quite literally returned the pejorative "queer as
counterfeit" metaphor or trope-the latter of which denotes the turning away of
a word from its original meaning 28 7-back to its origins. On a certain level, the
Campaign's political strategy was quite ingenious: At the same time that the
activists were announcing or revealing themselves as queer in the sense of
counterfeit, they were symbolically passing queer or counterfeit currency.
Their strategy therefore involved a simultaneous process of outing and passing.
But the Campaign took it one step further still. By publicly staging or
performing what is typically considered to be a deceptive act of passing-be it
the passing of counterfeit currency or the passing of one's sexual identity-the
activists were undoing the very act that gave rise to the queer as counterfeit
stereotype in the first instance.
In his seminal piece on covering, Professor Yoshino chooses "the word
'queer' to denominate 'gays who refuse to cover,"' that is, to downplay their
sexual identity.288 While noting that such a defmition "represent[s] precisely
the essentialization of sexual identity [that queer theorists] resist, 2 89 Yoshino
nevertheless observes that "[i]n popular parlance ... the perception that
'queers' are gays who refuse to cover is common, not least because normals
have cast them in these terms." 290 Yoshino's definition of queer is noteworthy
287.

XVIII OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 581 (2d ed. 1989) (entry for trope, n.).
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289.
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Yoshino, supra note 3, at 839.
Id.
Id. Yoshino defines "normals" as "a group of people who are openly gay, but who
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and of particular relevance here because it highlights an additional aspect of the
queer as counterfeit analogy that this Article has not discussed but that inheres
in the very idea of a queer three dollar bill, namely, the fact that queer connotes
something that is strange or unusual 29 1-that is, something whose eccentricity
and deviation from the norm (say, a one or a five dollar bill) calls attention to
itself. Earlier this Article suggested that the slang phrase, "queer as a three
dollar bill," cannot simply convey counterfeit in the sense of deceptive because
everybody knows that a three dollar bill is a fake when they see one.292 Part of
what makes queers different from normals, it would seem, is that their refusal to
cover is accompanied by a sense that they are flaunting their so-called deviation
from the norm and thereby forcing the public to take account of the fact that
they are three dollar bills. At first blush, then, these two senses of queer, queer
as counterfeit and queer as strange, are in disharmony and appear to perpetuate
the double bind in which sexual minorities are routinely placed: Whereas the
former sense of queer connotes covert deception (passing and/or covering), the
latter sense of queer connotes visible difference (outing and/or flaunting).
The Queer Dollars Campaign's activists, however, effectively played on
this disharmony (or dual sense of queer) by publicly performing an identity that
is routinely cast in deceptive, counterfeit terms. Their public staging and
performative recasting of the queer as counterfeit trope represents an example
of what queer theorist Judith Butler might call "parodic performativity," that is,
the process by which ostensibly stable and essential categories like "sex and
gender [are] denaturalized by means of a performance which avows their
distinctness and dramatizes the cultural mechanism oftheir fabricated unity. 293
Butler's paradigm example of parodic performativity is drag, which, she
suggests, complicates "the relation between the 'imitation' and the 'original"'
by "play[ing] upon the distinction between the anatomy of the performer and
the gender that is being performed., 294 Moreover, "[i]n imitating gender, drag
implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender itself-as well as its
contingency., 295 In a similar vein, postmodern theorist, Jean Baudrillard,
contends that an imitation or copy of an archetypal model has the power to
displace the ontological primacy and basis of that model.296 In Simulacra and
seek to cover their sexual orientations, emphasizing their commonality with straights." Id.
291. XII OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 131, at 1015 (entry for queer, n.).
292. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the three dollar bill analogy).
293. JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 138
(1990).
294. Id. at 137.
295. Id.
296. JEAN BAUDRILLARD, SIMULACRA AND SIMULATION 6 (Shelia Faria Glaser trans., Univ.
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Simulation, Baudrillard writes that a simulation (an image or imitation) of
reality (an original form) undergoes a four-step process whereby it (1) "is the
reflection of a profound reality;" (2) "masks and denatures a profound reality;"
(3) "masks the absence of a profound reality;" and (4) "has no relation to any
reality whatsoever: It is its own pure simulacrum. ''297 Baudrillard's theory of
simulation, and the simulacra that simulation produces, recalls Butler's theory
of the process by which drag reveals not only the "absence" of the "reality" of
sex and gender, but their imitative structure as well.
How might Butler and Baudrillard's respective theories of performative
imitation and simulation, each of which is far more comprehensive than the
cursory analysis here permits, supply us with a lens through which to consider
the productive possibilities of the counterfeiting analogy to same-sex relations?
Fortunately, the Queer Dollars Campaign has already provided us with an
instance where the queer and postmodern theories casually discussed here have
been put into practice. Where same-sex marriage opponents, commentators
like Professor Dent, and even some radical queer theorists regard same-sex
marriage as mimicry, fraudulent, a counterfeit, a "mocking burlesque," a "mere
parody," and a "caricature of the real thing,, 298 the Campaign's activists
understood the fertile, performative possibilities of that very "counterfeit" or
"parody." Moreover, where the Campaign performatively enacted the double
bind of the queer as a three dollar bill counterfeiting trope, we might imagine a
situation where the counterfeiting trope that has been applied to same-sex
marriage (and same-sex reproduction) might similarly be turned on itself.
Perhaps queer activists might publicly stage a wedding while putting
counterfeit dollars into the Salvation Army's kettles-revealing that marriage,
like money, is an eminently imitable construct that earns its legitimacy from the
law that so orders it. Marriage-like sex, gender, whiteness-might emerge as
no more naturally given than the counterfeiting rhetoric that supports it. To
mimic marriage in this way is not to suggest that marriage is a bad thing or that
queer activists should refocus their energies on less conservative causes.
Rather, all it means is that same-sex marriage opponents have reminded us that
marriage is a product or fungible good that can be counterfeited-one whose
exchange value is determined by the law and whose form lends itself to daring
imitative possibilities. In this sense, counterfeiting rhetoric reveals the power
of its own transformative potential.

of Michigan Press 1994) (1981).
297. Id.
298. See Dent, supra note 235, at 425.
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VII. Conclusion

This Article has considered the historical relationship between unorthodox
sexual/reproductive practices and counterfeiting in order to suggest the
following: Just as counterfeiting rhetoric rests on the same logic that shores up
the procreation rationale for same-sex marriage prohibitions, so too does the
procreation rationale rest on the same logic that shores up counterfeiting
rhetoric. Understanding how the counterfeiting analogy and the procreation
rationale for same-sex marriage prohibitions intersect with each other helps to
explain what is driving each. How can same-sex marriage opponents possibly
characterize same-sex marriage as counterfeit? Because same-sex couples both
engage in non-procreative sex and are having families through artificial means
that allow them to pass for the real thing. Similarly, why has the procreation
rationale been so successful in recent same-sex marriage litigation if that
rationale, in whichever form it has assumed, is so logically flimsy? Because
both same-sex sex and the kind of families that same-sex couples quite literally
reproduce are considered to be fraudulent reproductions of the real thing,
which, in turn, attempt to pass for the real thing.
Earlier this Article suggested that we view the evolution of the procreation
rationale for same-sex marriage prohibitions through the interpretive lens of
Reva Siegel's theory of "preservation-through-transformation," 2 99 that is, the
theory that status hierarchies are maintained, in part, because the "justificatory
rhetoric" that supports them evolves over time to assume a kinder, gentler
tone. 300 Commenting on Siegel's theory, Yoshino has remarked that
"[p]reservation-through-transformation does not foreclose the possibility of real
social change. Nor does it assume bad intent on the part of the individual legal
actors. It does, however, caution that progress narratives about status
hierarchies should be approached with intense skepticism. 3 01 This Article has
looked at the extent to which two such progress narratives, including the
evolution of the procreation rationale for same-sex marriage prohibitions and
the rhetorical re-casting of gays and lesbians as society's counterfeiters rather
than disgust-inducing outcasts, have worked together to maintain a pre-existing
status hierarchy based on sexual orientation. Moreover, it has done so by
turning to historical and literary narratives about the interrelationship among
counterfeiting, non-procreative sex, and miscegenation-the latter of which
represents a fitting parallel to the fears surrounding marriage mixing and
299.
300.
301.

Siegel, supra note 28, at 1113.
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passing that have surfaced in the legal controversy over same-sex marriage. It
has shown that historical and literary narratives provide us with the tools by
which to channel the intense skepticism that progress narratives so often inspire
and with which to challenge the rhetorical tropes that have become such an
integral part of the way in which we justify certain status hierarchies that we
barely even notice them.

